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ABSTRACT 
The impetus for this piece of work was the question ‘What type of people ought we to 
become?’, which first arose with Aristotle and which became, in Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
After Virtue, ‘Who are we now becoming?'.  Through a comparative study of the key 
concepts of Aristotelian ethics, for example, eudaimonia, the centrality of reason, the 
Doctrine of the Mean, and the key concepts of Buddhist ethics, for example, karma 
and nirvana, the interdependence of morality, meditation and insight, the central role 
of mindfulness and compassion, I will present the guidelines for a "moral way" for 
young people. 
An  analysis  of  the  differences  between  the  two  ethical  systems  draws  out  their 
different emphases on reason and compassion, and the separateness of self and other 
in Aristotelian moral agency in contrast to the inseparability of all sentient beings in 
Buddhism. But an examination of their similarities reveals how reason and emotion 
contribute to each, and how both are teleological in assuming that a person has a final 
end. 
The interplay of Aristotelian habituation and Buddhist mindfulness is identified as a 
potentially transformative “moral way” for young people, and suggestions are made 
for  how  to  facilitate  the  two  practices  as  a  pedagogical  support.  The  main 
recommendation  is  that,  subject  to  further  research  and  successful  pilot-studies, 
habituation and mindfulness practices be introduced in Primary Two and maintained 
into secondary education in Scottish schools. 
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Introduction 
The initial research proposal was to examine the notion of Aristotle’s ‘virtue ethics’ and 
to find its place in formal education. The term virtue ethics has come into use in the final 
decades of the twentieth century with reference to any ethical system for which an agent’s 
virtuous/vicious character is the criterion for assessing him/her as a morally good/bad 
person. My interest arose from reading Alasdair MacIntyre’s landmark case for virtue 
ethics, After Virtue,
1 first published in 1981, which directed my attention to the way in 
which questions about moral character had recently come to occupy a central place in 
philosophical discussion. MacIntyre traced part of the explanation for this development to 
the  publication  in  1958  of  G.  E.  M.  Anscombe's  seminal  article  "Modern  Moral 
Philosophy."
2 MacIntyre had been influenced by the anthropological turn in this article, 
and his thoughts on it offered a philosophical challenge to his generation. In summoning 
ethicists to look at persons, he suggested as Aristotle had before him, that ethics address 
the question:  ‘What type of people ought we to become?’  Instead of asking ‘whether an 
action is right’, he re-personalised ethics, and suggested that we start discussing not only 
what  we  are  now  doing,  but  more  importantly,  ‘who  are  we  now  becoming?’    The 
question MacIntyre raised in 1981 still challenges us to-day and continues to be important 
both socially and philosophically. 
Firstly, the issue of what kind of people we are is relevant in to-day’s globalised, highly 
technological  world,  particularly  in  western  society,  in  which  young  people  are 
surrounded  by  a  culture  which  promotes  an  individualist  approach  to  living,  where 
hedonism  is  presented  as  the  ultimate  yardstick,  and  the  advertising  slogan  “Because 
you’re worth it” sums up the main motivating reason for  any number of actions.   In  
Scotland this cultural pressure is allied to a socio-economic climate which is one of the 
                                                 
1  MacIntyre, A. [1981]  After Virtue: a study in moral theory. 
2 ‘Philosophy,’ vol. XXXIII,  no. 124: 1-19.   2 
worst  in  the  United  Kingdom.  There  is  a  continuing  division  of  the  population  into 
‘haves’  and  ‘have-nots’  which  translates  into  social  deprivation  and  poor  health, 
especially in larger urban areas, with unemployment and alcohol abuse more predominant 
at the lower end of the social scale, and substance abuse and a high incidence of personal 
debt at all social levels.  The division within families reflected in the higher divorce rate 
in  recent  years  in  Scotland  has  been  accompanied  by  both  economic  and  political 
pressures  on  all  adults  of  working  age  to  be  in  some  form  of  employment.  There  is 
nothing new in adults reporting a growing loss of respect for authority on the part of 
young people. Nor is the high rate of abuse of alcohol and drugs among Scottish young 
people surprising, when unemployment combines with peer pressure and, in urban areas, 
the need to belong leads them to identify with their own ‘gang.’  However, there is an 
increase across Britain in informal reports by young people of a lack of involvement with 
caring adults.   
The following is drawn from the key findings of the most recent report on suicide in 
Scotland
3 and reveals a trend confirmed by other current research. Within the time-frame 
of the study (1989-2003) rates of male suicide increased by 22% and rates of female 
suicide increased by 6%.  The highest rate among men occurred in the 25-34 year age 
group. The overall picture shows: 
The  excess  of  suicide  deaths  among  males  (approximately  fourfold)  was 
particularly marked in younger age groups (15-34). 
 
While the pattern in England is similar to that in Scotland, the figures relating to younger 
males  are  significantly  higher  statistically  in  Scotland  compared  to  England.  The 
correlation  between  male  suicides  and  class  five,  the  lowest  social  group,  was  also 
statistically significant, linking suicide with social deprivation.  
                                                 
3 Platt, S., Boyle, P., Crombie, I., Feng, Z., Exeter, D.  [2007] “Epidemiology of suicide in Scotland for 
period 1989-2003: an example of temporal trends and risk factors at national and local levels.”      3 
In the western world the sixties’ “sexual revolution,” followed the introduction of more 
reliable methods of birth-control, such as the contraceptive pill, and led to increasingly 
permissive attitudes to sexual behaviour. Trends in demographic and social changes in the 
UK since the Second World War continue to show decreasing figures for marriage whilst 
the figures for divorce increase.  At present, concern is being voiced about various issues 
affecting  young  people.  The  sexual  trafficking  of  young  women  in  the  UK  is  one.  
Increase in sexually transmitted diseases and ignorance among young people generally 
about  the  latter  and  their  causes  is  another  issue  in  the  public  domain.  Likewise  the 
premature sexualisation of pre-teen girls who are being targeted in magazines, TV, music, 
film, the Internet and all advertising media for the sake of the “teeny-weeny” pound. This 
consumerist  pressure  on  prepubescent  girls  across  North  America  and  the  UK  is 
strengthened by the fact that they share a common language.  
A website of the UK’s Department for Education and Skills highlights differences 
between North America and Britain on the one hand, and mainland Europe on the 
other.  In comparing teenage pregnancy rates over the previous thirty years it begins 
by stating that, in the 1970s figures in Britain were similar to the rest of Europe. It 
continues: 
But while other countries got theirs down in the 1980s and 1990s, Britain’s rate 
stayed high. The latest available figures show that Britain’s teenage birth rate is 
five times that in Holland, three times higher than in France and double the rate 
in  Germany.  Other  English-speaking  countries  such  as  Canada  and  New 
Zealand have teenage birth rates higher than ours. In the United States the rate 
is more than double that in the UK. 
 
In 1999 the Government published a Teenage Pregnancy Report from its Social 
Exclusion Unit. It acknowledged there was no  single cause, but pointed out 
three major factors: first, that many young people think they will end up on 
benefit anyway so they see no reason not to get pregnant. Second, that teenagers 
don’t know enough about contraception and about what becoming a parent will 
involve.  Third,  that  young  people  are  bombarded  with  sexual  images  in  the 
media but feel they can’t talk about sex to their parents and teachers.
4 
                                                 
4 [1999] Teenage Pregnancy, Stationary Office, London. Referred to on Social Exclusion Unit website.     4 
 
It is recognised that the reasons for these differences derive from a complex of political 
and social changes that have occurred over the previous sixty years and research in these 
areas continues to grow and inform new and emerging policies.  
Two other points are relevant to this sketch of the social malaise at work in present day 
Britain.  Firstly, the reach of powerful vested interests is not confined only to the very 
young.  There has been a recent “massification”
5 through the cult of celebrities across 
contemporary culture from sport and entertainment by all the print and broadcast media, 
which celebrates and promotes the glamour and sexual prowess of figures ‘famous for 
being famous,’ who have a world-wide selling power. The public is sold the aspiration of 
acquiring the consumerist life-style on offer in “OK!” and “Hello!” magazines. Only in 
the most unusual circumstances do the TV and print media feature an ‘everyman’ figure 
as hero; John Smeaton is one such rare example.
6  
Secondly, as elsewhere in Britain, in Scotland limits are not internalised but are imposed 
upon  young  people  in  the  form  of  an  “Anti-Social  Behaviour  Order.”  Paradoxically,  
‘Asbos’  have  become  a  badge  of  honour  among  some  young  people.  In  the  worst 
instances, young men and, increasingly, young women are caught up in a gang-culture 
which has delivered deadly consequences in recent years from guns and knives.
7  
From to-day’s social perspective, it is even more crucial than in 1981, when  Macintyre 
first issued his challenge to western society, to address the question as to who we are now 
                                                 
5 Oxford ED definition of this term:  “The action of promoting or enforcing uniformity in a society; the 
process of becoming a mass society, especially through development of the mass media.” 
6 John Smeaton, is a baggage handler who helped prevent the terrorists attempting to blow up the 
crowded passenger terminal in Glasgow Airport on June 30
th, 2007. Subsequently, he  became world 
headline news. 
7 Introducing measures to discourage violence, with children below the age of three years as target 
group, Strathclyde’s deputy Chief of Police reported that the week’s figures for assault using guns and 
knives were higher in the region than anywhere south of the border. (STV News, 18 March, 2007)   
   5 
becoming,  and  advocated  moral  ‘practices’  for  restoring  what  has  been  lost  within 
ourselves and our communities.  
Whilst these questions are crucial socially, they are equally important philosophically, 
both for our own sake as well as for the sake of future generations. It is a difficult task to 
motivate  oneself,  let  alone  another,  to  respond  to  the  question:  “Who  am  I  now 
becoming?”  Steadily decreasing church attendances over the past thirty years in Scotland 
mirror a parallel decline in the influence of the former moral framework.  A return to an 
authoritarian mode of morality is not desirable but there is a moral vacuum presently that 
it would be foolhardy to ignore. 
With  the  publication  of  After  Virtue,  MacIntyre  gave  a  powerful  critique  of  what  he 
considered the steady deterioration in moral philosophy which followed the project of the 
ahistorical Enlightenment to discover rational foundations for an objective morality. With 
the publication of The Gay Science in 1882 Friedrich Nietzsche, prophetic voice of the 
philosophically  nihilist  generations  to  come,  made  short  shrift  of  the  Enlightenment 
project, and confronted the problem this act of destruction had created: if there is nothing 
to morality but expressions of will, my morality can only be what my will creates.
8  The 
twentieth  century  saw  moral  philosophy  splitting  off  into  existentialism,  emotivism, 
relativism,  and,  following  post-modern  influences,  attempts  being  made  to  jettison  it 
altogether. Particularly in the cultural climate of the western world, which puts a constant 
emphasis on individual choice in everything, it is perhaps not too surprising to find that 
relativism prevails to-day in Britain as the main moral response among young people – 
“this is right for me; what’s right for you is up to you.”  This presupposes that moral 
judgements are merely a matter of individual preference, taste, or no more than a lifestyle 
choice.  
                                                 
8 Kaufmann, W.  (Trans.) [1974] The Gay Science, Section 335.    6 
I will argue for the possibility of an objective moral framework that can hold across all 
cultures. In a pluralist society such as ours, young people are faced with conflicting and 
unstable moral standards. The increasingly frequent experience for young people, in an 
increasingly  secular  society  such  as  our  own,  is  an  absence  of  authoritative  moral 
guidelines; there is more evidence of relativism as has already been mentioned. So, if 
moral education is to have a coherent philosophical underpinning in such a society, it is 
important to discuss MacIntyre’s question: What type of people ought we to become?  
This thesis proceeds on several assumptions that are all arguable but not pursued here, for 
the sake of embarking and focussing on the topic: firstly, whilst social and environmental 
factors are indisputable in human growth and development, the origins of ethics are to be 
found in human nature; secondly, that living ethically does not depend necessarily on a 
code of ethics derived from professing a faith; and thirdly, in respect of the Buddhist 
content,  the  author  will  draw  mainly  on  Mahayana  Buddhism,  a  traditional  form  of 
Buddhism which has been highly influential in the development of Buddhist ideas. 
The original proposal has developed towards a comparison of Aristotelian and Buddhist 
ethics, with particular application to moral education.  The first major shift in focus arose 
when a study of MacIntyre’s advocacy of a renewal of virtue ethics led me back to his 
source  in  Aristotle’s  ethics.  Consequently,  while  an  interest  in  MacIntyre’s  thesis  is 
maintained in this project, the foundational text, on which the western ethical tradition in 
this  comparison  draws,  is  Aristotle’s  account  of  the  moral  life  and  the  virtues  in  his 
Nichomachean Ethics.
9  
The  second  shift  arose  with  the  realisation  that  an  examination  of,  and  simple 
recommendation to adopt Aristotle’s ethical system alone, would be more an imposition 
on any particular social group. A dialogue between Aristotle’s ethical system and another 
                                                 
9  The work is a set of lecture notes either written for his student son, Nichomachus, or edited by him.    7 
quite  distinct  moral  system,  and  the  comparison  of  their  different  metaphysical 
foundations, is more likely to provide an effective analysis for any useful discussion and 
the proposal of a moral way. Drawing on the tradition from the world religions with 
which I am most familiar – the Abrahamic religions – might mean the analysis would not 
have far to go, as all three religions are similar to Aristotle, insofar as they are grounded 
on a dualist metaphysics; this is the view that both material and immaterial (mental and 
spiritual) realities exist. The intellectual traditions of the theistic religions all hold that 
only substantival dualism does justice to the distinction between God and creature.   
However, unlike Aristotle, the Abrahamic religions base their ethics on Divine Law.
10 All 
three monotheistic religions share the belief that the foundation of the moral code is based 
on God’s law, as revealed or given in their respective scriptures, whilst Aristotle’s ethics, 
is rooted in human nature. Ethics in the tradition of Catholic Christianity is an interesting 
exception to that of the Abrahamic religions in general.  One of the major contributions of 
Thomas Aquinas was to draw on Aristotle (among others) and to re- create Aristotle’s 
ethics in the light of Christian belief  This led to the development of Natural Law ethics, 
that is, an ethics grounded on human nature;  the Law revealed in Scripture is secondary.   
 
A more useful contrast with Aristotle emerges, when his ethics are compared with those 
of an Eastern world religion such as Buddhism, which is founded on a monist (from 
Greek monos, “single”) metaphysics. This allows that only one being exists; all sentient 
beings ultimately comprise a non-theistic, interrelated network which the Buddhist monk 
Tich  Nat  Hahn  describes  as  “Inter-being.”  Therefore,  for  the  purposes  of  dialogue, 
Buddhist ethics has been selected in comparison to Aristotelian ethics in this enquiry for 
two reasons:  it offers a unique metaphysical foundation, one quite distinct from that 
                                                 
10 The Hebrew Scriptures and the Christian Old Testament refer to the Divine Law as the Decalogue or 
the Ten Commandments.    8 
presented by Aristotle, but shares his pre-supposition, that ethics has its roots in human 
nature.   
The aim in this thesis is twofold: firstly, to compare Aristotelian and Buddhist ethics; 
secondly,  to  examine  the  connections,  if  any,  between  the  two,  with  a  view  to  any 
possible interplay which may provide a “moral way” for young people, in particular those 
of school age.  The remainder of this introduction is a short account of each of its five 
chapters.  
 
Chapter One provides an examination of Aristotelian ethics.   
Aristotle opens the first book of his Metaphysics, which will provide the foundational 
basis of his ethics and politics, with the sentence: ‘All men by nature desire to know.’
11 In 
his Nichomachean Ethics and his Politics he understands likewise that there is the same  
innate desire in human nature for the goods of justice, friendship and community as there 
is for the goods of knowledge. It is to the inbuilt human inclination for association with 
others that Aristotle attributes his description of man as a ‘social animal.’  In a similar 
vein, the arête, excellences or virtues, the presence or absence of which decide whether or 
not the individual and the polis or community enjoy the moral and intellectual goods, 
arise from human nature.  David Carr argues that:
  
The question about whether ethical reflection should start from the facts of human 
nature is not simply a conceptual question, but a normative one: it is not a question 
of theory to be addressed by appeal to logical consistency or supporting empirical 
evidence, but one about how we ought – practically or morally – to conduct our 
affairs.
 12   
 
Aristotle  is  far  from  imagining  that  human  nature  provides  us  with  readymade 
dispositions for morally appropriate behaviour from the outset; he stresses the need for 
                                                 
11 Barnes, J.  (ed.) [1984], The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton 
UP. Metaph., A,  980 a, 1.   
12 Carr, D.  [2005]  ‘Psychology and Ethics in the Theory of Moral Education and Development and the 
Idea of a ‘Psychologised Morality.’  Paper presented at AME conference, 6
th Nov. 2005, Boston, USA.   9 
training  and  habituation  from  earliest  childhood,  if  dispositions  are  to  be  developed, 
which will, in time, become spontaneous. He points out the overriding importance of such 
work:
  
It makes no small difference then, whether we form habits of one kind or another 
from our very youth; it makes a great difference or rather all the difference… 
13 
 
Chapter Two is an exploration of Buddhist ethics. 
The Buddha has a different conception of human nature from Aristotle but, like him, 
he believes that it is from our human nature that our virtues and our vices arise. 
Similarly to Aristotle, he places great importance on training and education, but this 
time unlike Aristotle, he links morality interdependently with meditation and insight: 
all three, morality, meditation, and insight, are required for progress on the spiritual 
path to enlightenment.  The main emphases are on the Buddha himself as exemplar of 
sila or morality, on the centrality of karuna or compassion and samadhi or meditative 
culture in qualifying one as virtuous, and on the importance of leading a good life, if 
one is to achieve prajna or the insight essential for  ‘awakening.’   
The key-notions of dukkha or suffering, the Noble Eightfold Path, and the concepts of 
‘emptiness,’ and ‘No-Self’ will be presented and discussed.  While there are different 
slants in the many forms of Buddhism on the latter concepts of emptiness and No-
Self,  they  are    understood  here  within  a  metaphysical  framework  of  dependent 
origination  and  monist  intrasubjectivity  (identification  of  subject  and  object)  as 
understood in Mahayana Buddhism.  
 
Chapter Three examines the dissimilarities between Aristotelian and Buddhist ethics. 
                                                 
13 NE, II, 3, 1103 b25 (my italics) 
 
   10 
Among the many forms of Buddhism, Mahayana Buddhism has been selected here as 
the model, since it arguably has a metaphysics, which, though complex, provides a 
most highly developed foundations for its ethics.  As already mentioned, generally the 
Buddhist ideal is predicated on living many lives on the model of the Buddha; in the 
case of Mahayana Buddhism, it is modelled on that of the Bohdisattva.
14  In contrast, 
the Aristotelian ideal is based on the development of individual potential over the 
course of one life, where the main emphasis is on phronesis or practical reason, for it 
is that which controls our response to desire and feelings.
15 Only the virtuous person 
has  this  practical  intelligence/wisdom  necessary  for  exercising  responsible  moral 
choice.   
In  contrast,  Mahayana  Buddhism  emphasises  moral  intuitionism  and  appeals  to 
loving-kindness and compassion. Reason is present but assumed to be only a part of 
one’s morality.  Virtue, for the Buddhist, is more the effect of letting go of egoism 
through  an  interdependent  practice  of  mindfulness,  meditation,  and  morality;  this 
reflects a metaphysical world-view which presumes the collapse of subject and object 
into one/self as sole determiner of thought and experience.  To shape one’s world, one 
has to think of oneself as being one with the universe through one’s breathing, though 
thinking of  oneself as a karmic force in this way is not as easy as it sounds. On the 
other hand, Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia for man has an essentially societal 
dimension: excellence is not fixed and determined for all time, but is inextricably 
linked to the nature of  one’s society, and this in turn sets limits to the ability of 
individuals to ‘create’ their own conception of the good.  
 
                                                 
14 Bohdisattva: in Mahayana Buddhism, a being destined for enlightenment, who vows to refrain from 
entering nirvana until every being is saved. 
15 Phronesis is translated variously as practical reason/wisdom/intelligence. I will use the terms 
interchangeably.   11 
Chapter Four concentrates on the similarities between the two sets of ethics. 
Aristotelian  and  Buddhist  ethics  are  alike  formally:  each  advocates  moderation,                  
Aristotle by his Doctrine of the Mean, the Buddha by his Middle Way.   
Both Aristotelian and Buddhist ethics are teleological. Those of Aristotle are more 
frankly so, in that, for him, the good life just is the life lived in accordance with arête 
or virtue, where virtue is to be understood against the background of a teleological 
conception of man – a conception according to which human beings have a specific 
nature  which  determines  their  proper  aims  and  goals,  that  is,  their  end.  On  his 
account, the virtues are excellences of character which enable people to move towards 
their telos or goal, and are an essential part of the attainment of that goal.
16 Moreover, 
a person, who strives for the eudaimon life, participates here and now in the happiness 
or sense of fulfilment which a “life of activity in accordance with the virtues” affords. 
The telos or end for the Buddha calls for a more radical transformation of human 
nature through rigorous mental and moral training, and the exercise of compassion, if 
one is to escape from dukkha or suffering brought about by karmic rebirth in the cycle 
of existence.  Letting go of all egoism will gain final release in post-death nirvana – a 
state of supra-mundane harmony/bliss.  To denote the latter state of ‘Absolute Truth,’ 
I will use the Sanskrit term nirvana, not the Pali term Nibbanah.  Though Buddhist 
terms in the literature are generally Pali, ‘nirvana’ has entered the English language 
and is, therefore, familiar.  
For  the  Buddha,  human  perfectibility  implies  that  the  individual’s  progress  in 
meditation  and  morality  on  the  Noble  Eightfold  Path  enables  participation  in  this 
liberated  state  to  be  experienced  in  the  course  of  following  the  path  to  its  final, 
nirvanic end. 
                                                 
16 For MacIntyre, such a conception from ancient Greek philosophy highlights the poverty of modern 
moral philosophy, which makes the autonomous decision of the individual the sole arbiter, thereby 
eschewing any final goal.    12 
 
Chapter  Five  postulates  “a  moral  way,”  drawn  in  the  main  from  the  interplay  of 
Aristotelian reason and Buddhist compassion as reflected in a comparison of their ethics.  
This constitutes a response to MacIntyre’s question as to what type of people we ought to 
become. 
From the point of view of this thesis, parents are acknowledged as the primary moral 
educators of their children, teaching them to “be good, know the good, and do the good,” 
(what Aristotle considered a necessary trinity regarding virtue). However, this chapter is 
also  intended  for  those  involved  in  formal  education;  school  teachers  in  particular  in 
western society are considered responsible for encouraging children’s continuing moral 
development.    Owing  to  their  professional  commitment  to  furthering  their  charges’ 
learning, they are confronted daily with the responsibility, albeit often unacknowledged or 
implicit,  for  developing  and  nurturing  the  moral  education  of  young  people  in  many 
different Scottish schools. To this end, whilst both Aristotle and the Buddha each insisted 
in  his  own  way  that  ethics  was  not  to  be  considered  an  exact  science,  supporting 
philosophical sources will be found in Aristotelian and Buddhist ethics which are able to 
provide guidelines for “a moral way” for young people in all schools.  It is hoped that this 
form will allow a pluralist audience greater freedom in employing them, as a basis for 
both discussion and decision-making.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   13 
Chapter One 
Aristotelian Virtue Ethics 
Aristotle opens the first book of his Metaphysics, which will provide the foundational 
basis of his ethics and politics, with the sentence: ‘All men by nature desire to know.’
17 In 
his Nichomachean Ethics and his Politics he understands likewise that there is the same  
innate desire in human nature for the goods of justice, friendship, and community, as 
there is for the goods of knowledge. It is to the inbuilt human inclination for association 
with others that Aristotle attributes his description of man as a ‘social animal:’ given this 
claim, the strength and up-building of the polis or community must then rest on mutual 
cooperation.  In a similar vein, the arête, excellences or virtues, the presence or absence 
of which decide whether or not the individual and the polis or community enjoy the moral 
and intellectual goods, arise from human nature. It should be noted, prior to the discussion 
(in the following section) of the goods of eudaimonia or leading a flourishing life, that, 
according to Aristotle, the conditions of possibility of the arête cannot depend solely on 
dispositions to act virtuously, but also on underlying factors, such as a certain measure of 
material prosperity, good health, and endowment. Though he himself never refers to these 
as ‘luck,’ he acknowledges the part chance plays, for example, regarding endowment: 
Nature’s part evidently does not depend on us, but as a result of divine causes is 
present in those who are truly fortunate.
18  
 
With regard to the arête or virtues themselves, David Carr argues that:
  
The question about whether ethical reflection should start from the facts of human 
nature is not simply a conceptual question, but a normative one: it is not a question 
of theory to be addressed by appeal to logical consistency or supporting empirical 
evidence,  but  one  about  how  we  ought  –practically  or  morally  –to  conduct  our 
affairs.
 19  
 
                                                 
17 Barnes, J. (ed.) [1984], The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Metaph, 
A, 980 a, 1. Princeton UP.  
18 NE 1179b21 
19 Carr, D.  [2005] “Psychology and Ethics in the Theory of Moral Education and Development and the 
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Aristotle  is  far  from  imagining  that  human  nature  provides  us  with  readymade 
dispositions for morally appropriate behaviour from the outset; he stresses the need for 
training  and  habituation  from  earliest  childhood,  if  dispositions  are  to  be  developed, 
which will, in time, become spontaneous. He points out the overriding importance of such 
work: 
But the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts 
as well.  For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing 
them, for example, men become builders by building and lyre players by playing the 
lyre: so do we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, 
brave  by  doing  brave  acts.    This  is  confirmed  by  what  happens  in  the  State;  for 
legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them….It makes no small 
difference….whether we form habits of one kind or another from our very youth; it 
makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference. 
20 
 
The point and purpose of engaging in ethics, according to Aristotle, is to become good: 
For we are enquiring not in order to know what virtue is but in order to become 
good since otherwise our enquiry would be of no use.  
 
He first examines the way the most common ethical word ‘good’ is used and notices that 
every act aims at some good: 
Every art and every enquiry and similarly every action and every pursuit is thought 
to aim at some good and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that 
at which all things aim.
21 
 
Aristotle distinguishes early on between things which are good as means, that is, for the 
sake of something else, and things that are good as ends, that is, for their own sake only. 
Regarding human activity, he asks whether there is one final end for human beings.  His 
argument leads to the following affirmative conclusion: 
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If  there  is  some  end  of  the  things  we  do,  which  we  desire  for  its  own  sake 
(everything  else  being  desired  for  the  sake  of  this),  and  if  we  do  not  choose 
everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go to 
infinity so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good 
and the chief good.  Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on 
life?  Shall we not, like archers, who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit 
upon what is right? 
22 
 
Alban McCoy points out that this line has been criticized by modern philosophers: 
[On] the grounds that, since all chains must stop somewhere…… it does not follow 
that there is the final end [or good] where all chains must stop.
23 
  
While this is logically plausible, McCoy takes an apparently unjustified step in his next 
statement: 
It can also be said that if human beings are unified wholes, it is reasonable to expect 
to find that, just as each action has an end, so our life as a whole has an end and 
purpose.
24 
 
His claim is apparently unjustified because his primary assumption – our life as a whole 
has an end and purpose – is nowhere substantiated.  However, perhaps this is too harsh; it 
is, after all, only a weak conditional claim (“if human beings are unified wholes”) that 
gestures towards, rather than concludes, that life is a unified whole. Aristotle calls his 
final end, where the means to end must stop, and for the sake of which everything is 
(ultimately) done, eudaimonia in Greek. This is most often translated into English by 
happiness, but does not equate with a sense of happiness as a state of euphoria.  Various 
translations in English show the range of meanings of the Greek eudaimonia: a state of 
flourishing, fulfilment, well-being or contentment.   
Aristotle’s first argument for happiness as the final end of human beings is known as the 
ergon argument, that is, the argument from function.  Human flourishing requires the 
                                                 
22 NE 1994a18-24 
23 McCoy, A. [2004]  The Fundamentals of Christian Ethics, p. 108  
24  Ibid. 
 
 
   16 
activity of that part of human beings which is peculiar to them, and whose right function 
yields  a  particular  outcome,  the  good  life.  Thus,  the  ergon  of  man  is  to  lead  an 
eudaemonist life, a life in which Aristotle emphasises the activity of the soul or mind, as 
he puts forward in the following:                          
         For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor or any artist and in general for all 
things that have a function of activity (praxis), the good and the ‘well’ is thought to 
reside  in  the  function,  so  it  would  seem  to  be  for  man,  if  he  has  a  function. 
……What then can this be?  Life seems to be common even to the plants, but we 
are seeking what is peculiar to man.  Let us exclude therefore the life of nutrition 
and  growth.    Next  there  would  be  a  life  of  perception  but  it  also  seems  to  be 
common even to the horse, the ox and every animal.  There remains then an active 
life of the element that has a rational principle…..human good turns out to be the 
activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there is more than one virtue, in 
accordance with the best and most complete.  But we must add ‘in  a  complete 
life.’
25  
 
John Finnis argues that Aristotle’s function argument, which is modelled on the machine, 
is ‘not the deep structure of his ethical method; it is an erratic boulder.’ This striking, but 
peculiar, phrase reflects Finnis’ belief that the function argument sends us off course; he 
points rather to a series of appeals by Aristotle in Nichomachean Ethics to what everyone 
or no one would say, and to what everyone or no one would choose.  This is not an 
argument that falls prey to the fallacy of an appeal to the majority or to what the majority 
thinks: Aristotle is plain in his rejection of opinions based on numbers.
26  Finnis notes: 
“The primary… function of these appeals to what we or others (or ‘everyone’) would say 
or choose is to prompt or remind us….firstly, of our own and others’ pre-philosophical 
experience, and secondly, of our own and others’ practical and pre-philosophical grasp of 
good(s).” [Finnis, The Fundamentals of Ethics, 1983, p. 17] 
So Aristotle says that 
No  one  would  choose  to  live  with  the  intellect  of  a  child  throughout  his  life, 
however much he were to be pleased at the things that children are pleased at….
27 
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No  one  chooses  to  possess  the  whole  world  if  he  has  first  to  become  someone 
else…..; he wishes for this only on condition of being whatever he is.
28 
 
McCoy supports Finnis in viewing Aristotle as making us conscious of what we all know 
pre-philosophically, after reflecting on our common experience, about what is good and, 
therefore, what is wanted naturally by human beings.  
With regard to the goal ‘of a complete life,’ in Book X, chapter 7, of the Nichomachean 
Ethics Aristotle concludes that eudaimonia is most perfectly attained in a life of activity 
in  accordance  with  its  highest  virtue,  that  is,  the  exercise  of  reason  in  contemplation 
(theoria).
29 Aristotle argues that the highest good consists in contemplation or intellectual 
speculation,  but  it  is  only  possible  to  agree  with  his  conclusion,  if  we  accept  that 
eudaimonia consists of a dominant good and that, in practice, the intellectual virtue of 
contemplation is attainable by a minority of educated individuals. Aristotle’s conception 
of  speculative  reflection  as  the  summit  of  happiness  accords  with  his  belief  that  the 
ultimate goal is to understand the world. Moreover, it fits his view of contemplation as 
exclusive to human beings.  Indeed, to show the distinctiveness of the cognitive in human 
nature, he describes it as a good we share with the gods –what the gods and human beings 
have in common is the power to make the potential actual.  Aristotle maintains that we all 
have dispositions to act in accordance with virtue and that it is the exercise of virtue, both 
moral and intellectual, which leads to theoria or intellectual contemplation.  
It must be said that a life devoted to the greatest possible extent to speculative thought is 
capable of being exercised and attained by only an elite few.  As satisfying as such a life 
might be to-day to particle physicists, or philosophers, or mathematicians, to grant his 
claim that the exercise of rational and rigorous thought is the chief good –the crowning 
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achievement  of  a  flourishing  life  –  is  to  acknowledge  a  decided  tendency  to 
intellectualism in Aristotle.  
The notion of eudaimonia as inclusive is more convincing, with its conclusion that it is a 
complex of goods, ranging from many varieties of human flourishing –artistic, athletic, 
intellectual – to family and friendship, justice, the interconnectedness of the moral and 
intellectual virtues, than that of eudaimonia as the dominant good outlined above.  Under 
an inclusive conception the position of reason remains central. Whilst reason may always 
be an end in itself, reason can also be considered as part of the good for human beings, 
but on a level of means rather than final end. McCoy emphasises the instrumental nature 
of Aristotelian reason underlined elsewhere in the Ethics:  
Happiness and fulfilment will always involve the life of reason: that is, controlling 
and  directing  one’s  desires  and  emotions,  thinking  about  what  to  do,  trying  to 
understand one’s activities, making moral judgements, foreseeing the consequences 
of one’s actions, differentiating between various subordinate ends, while keeping 
one’s eye on the ultimate end. [McCoy, 2004, p. 111]  
 
Aristotle points to just such an interpretation in Book X, chapter 8, where he begins by 
talking about ‘a life lived in accordance with the other arête.’ Here the ‘other’ excellence  
is the intellectual virtue of phronesis, the highest skill or virtue of the mind when applied 
to all one’s actions, including thinking.  It is the virtue of practical reason or intelligence, 
which knows how to apply general principles in particular situations. It is not sophia or 
the ability to formulate principles intellectually, nor is it the ability to make a logical 
deduction as to what ought to be done.  It is the ability to act so that principle will take 
concrete form.  Phronesis is not only itself a virtue, it is the keystone of all virtue and 
cannot  be  exercised  in  the  absence  of  the  other  virtues.    Aristotle  points  out  that  to 
conduct one’s practical living well is just what one might hope a ‘composite being’ would   19 
do.
30 Of course, one need not be famous to qualify as an exemplar of the Aristotelian 
‘good  man;’  participating  with  a  fair  degree  of  thought  in  one’s  society  is  sufficient. 
However, to illustrate Aristotle’s eudaemonist ideal, it is helpful to use a famous public 
figure, such as Nelson Mandela.  It must be noted that, whilst Mandela – originally a 
politically engaged lawyer – exhibited phronesis, talent and integrity, he also enjoyed a 
degree of ‘moral luck,’ a term popularized by Bernard Williams.  Moral luck is not a term 
employed by Aristotle, but, as already mentioned, he does emphasise that a life of virtue 
requires the goods of material security, health and endowment.  Mandela was freed and 
emerged into public life without there having been time or occasion for him to acquire the 
baggage  that  usually  adheres  to  a  practising  politician.  Moreover,  his  subsequent 
leadership came at a moment in the troubled history of South Africa when reconciliation, 
which seemed to suit his character, was called for.
  
 
Central to Aristotle’s conception of human well-being is a secular moral framework. His 
claim is ‘by doing certain things one becomes a certain kind of person.’
31  Its goal is the 
development of arête, human virtues or excellences, as shapers of human character and, 
therefore, of human action and behaviour. More generally, the Greek term arête, used of 
an object, refers to that characteristic of it which makes it a good example of its kind; a 
knife is a good, even excellent, knife, if it cuts well.  When used of virtue, arête refers to 
excellence in general, mainly concerning the purpose of actions. The term aretaic is used 
of all virtue ethics which have excellence as their aim, for example, Kantian virtue ethics 
are aretaic in respect of duty.  Other forms of virtue ethics, for example, those which 
draw on a consequentialist model such as that of Thomas  Hurka, founded on results of an 
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action,  are  non-aretaic.    All  references  to  virtue  ethics  in  this  piece  of  work  are 
understood as Aristotelian aretaic virtue ethics, founded on the excellences of character. 
Moreover, Aristotle’s ethics is teleological; he sees the good as consisting in some natural 
purpose for human beings, that is, the exercise of virtue. The virtues are exactly those 
things apt to promote the well-being and flourishing of human beings qua human beings.  
Aristotle  is  most  insistent  about  human  nature,  that  the  good  life  is  one  lived  in 
harmonious and co-operative relations with our fellow human beings. Moreover, as well 
as being social animals, he considers us also rational animals: 
So our fulfilment will partly consist in the exercise of our rational faculties, both for 
practical and instrumental purposes, and for its own sake. Thus, for Aristotle, there 
are the moral virtues, which fit us for successful social relations within a civilized 
society;  and  the  intellectual  virtues,  which  enable  a  successful  engagement  in 
rational enterprises. [McCoy, 2004, p. 112] 
 
Aristotle  highlights  the  interconnectedness  of  all  the  virtues  in  his  emphasis  on  the 
intellectual virtue of phronesis which, he says, controls and directs desire and feelings: 
one cannot be morally good without practical wisdom, nor have practical wisdom 
without possessing the moral virtues.
32 
 
Phronesis and sophia or intellectual wisdom are interrelated. Phronesis needs sophia, but  
sophia  does  not  imply  phronesis.  Phronesis  leads  to  moral  goodness  but  only  when 
accompanied  by  the  moral  virtues.  Phronesis  and  the  moral  virtues  will  entail  moral 
goodness; if moral goodness is not present, this is due to the absence of one or the other, 
or both.   
 McCoy contrasts Plato and Aristotle in respect of virtue. Of Plato he says: 
Virtue is largely self-control and subjugation to the point of near extinction of the 
emotions as disturbances of the soul. [McCoy, 2004, p.12]  
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 Aristotle agrees that virtue is shown in rational control of the passions and appetites but, 
unlike Plato, he does not regard the passions, emotions, and appetites as intrinsically bad, 
or inconsistent with the moral life.  In Aristotle’s view, if someone were to lack certain 
passions and emotional responses, we would consider such a person a deficient human 
being.
33  
In  Chapter  6  of  Book  II  Aristotle  develops  his  account  of  the  way  the  emotions  are 
involved in moral virtue. The habitual disposition to respond emotionally will be a virtue 
only if the pattern of emotional responses is appropriate. To clarify what this entails, 
Aristotle introduces the doctrine of the mean, suggesting that the virtuous person is the 
moderate person, inclining to nothing in excess. This notion is not meant to suggest that 
the virtuous life is mediocre and uninspiring. What it helps to avoid are the extremes of 
hedonism and asceticism.  
The most important characteristic of the moral virtues for Aristotle is that they involve a 
particular pattern of emotional response to situations, for example, to criticise someone 
for being spiteful is to say something about a regular pattern of feeling and response 
which  that  person  exhibits  rather  than  a  single  responsive  action  on  any  particular 
occasion.  The person who is virtuous has had to practise both reflection as well as the 
application of her practical wisdom, and at the same time take rapid account of every new 
situation as it arises, if she is to develop disciplined control of her emotional responses. 
For Aristotle it is the cognitive aspect of our nature which humanizes us; nowhere is this 
clearer than in his definition of moral virtue:  
So, a [moral] virtue is a habitual disposition connected with choice, 
lying  in  a  mean  relative  to  us,  a  mean  which  is  determined  by 
reason, by which the person of practical wisdom would determine 
it.
34  
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When he speaks of moral virtues as ‘lying in a mean,’ Aristotle is not saying that the 
virtuous person is one who is by character disposed to have only moderate emotional 
responses but one whose pattern of emotional response is consistently appropriate to the 
situation. Accordingly, in varying situations it may be somewhere on a continuum, either 
very low key, moderate, or intense.  It is natural to feel fear in some circumstances, but 
we would count it a virtue where such fear is contained so as to avoid the kind of panic 
which might endanger the lives of others. On the other hand, if someone were to act 
rashly  in  dangerous  situations,  this  would  count  for  Aristotle  not  as  courage  but  as 
foolhardiness.  In his account the passions, emotions and appetites are intrinsic to the life 
of virtue, not inimical to it. The virtues are as much undermined by the lack of positive 
feelings as by the excess of negative ones.  His naturalist moral virtues are in contrast to 
those of Kant who conceives of virtue as necessarily devoid of feeling in its adherence to 
a categorical law. Aristotle’s virtues are concerned with the promotion of human well-
being, determined by rational judgement and choice about appropriate courses of action 
and conduct.  
‘Lying in a mean’ is not a criterion for discovering what the appropriate response is; it is 
neither quantitative nor  theoretical, more in the nature of  a feedback-loop. Why does 
Aristotle use the term ‘mean?’ He explains that we often speak of emotional responses as 
instances of either over or under-reacting. Very often (though, he points out, not in every 
case) we will have two sets of words to denote the vices characterised by habitual over or 
under-reacting.  For example, we have cowardice and rashness to contrast with bravery,
35 
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profligacy and meanness to contrast with generosity, and so on.
 36  Gerard J. Hughes notes 
that for Aristotle: 
There  are  some  emotional  responses  which  are  by  definition  inappropriate:  one 
cannot  have  just  the  right  degree  of  spitefulness  or  envy.  In  these  cases,  there 
simply is no ‘mean’, just as there are some types of action which are by definition 
always wrong, such as adultery, theft or murder. [Hughes, Aristotle on Ethics, 2001, 
p. 62]  
 
To speak then, in most cases, of virtues lying in the mean is to say what Aristotle earlier 
says about desires: the person with the virtue of moderation does not desire when he 
should not, or more than he should, nor in a way that he should not. But ‘should’ and 
‘should not’ can be defined only relatively to individuals in each set of circumstances.     
The question has been raised as to what ‘test’ of virtue Aristotle provides? It lies within 
the last phrase of his definition: ‘reason, by which the person of practical wisdom would 
determine it.’ Appropriate responses are the ones which are in accord with the judgement 
of a particular type of person – the person of practical wisdom. Moreover, virtues are to 
be defined in terms of a judgement. His claim implies that for an emotional response to be 
virtuous it must be in accord with what reason judges to be the true demands of the 
situation, since reason  aims at truth. Feelings, then, are not simply to  be accepted  as 
given. They are subject to rational assessment and ideally to rational control. The standard 
by  which  virtuous  and  vicious  dispositions  are  distinguished  from  one  another  is  a 
rational standard. The important point in every case is to discern and, if possible, name 
the patterns of emotional over- and under- reaction.   
 
Does Aristotle assume that the person of practical intelligence or wisdom would simply 
endorse  conventional  Athenian  morality,  so  that  such  a  person  could  be  recognized 
simply by seeing who was generally regarded as living a good life?  Not necessarily:  
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What such a person would endorse is Aristotle’s claim that the account of virtue as 
‘lying in a mean’ fits well with the individual virtues and vices with which his 
audience is familiar. [Hughes, 2001, pp. 66-67]   
 
One does not have to be an ancient Greek to admire virtuous behaviour in the Aristotelian 
sense  of  the  term,  so  people  from  many  different  cultures  can  respect,  and  aspire  to 
become, someone who is friendly, courageous, honest, generous, temperate, possessing an 
ethics of virtue in Aristotle’s sense.   
However, given the premium Aristotle places on the rational in human nature, it is not 
surprising that it is the cognitive aspect in his account of each of the virtues just listed 
which is uppermost. So, in his view, friends are chosen because they exhibit an admirable 
character, and one inspires reciprocal admiration in others on account of one’s virtuous 
character.  The notions of Christian self-sacrificing love or of Buddhist compassion are in 
sharp contrast to the more cognitive emphasis exemplified in the Aristotelian ‘good man;’ 
the difference between Aristotle’s semantic emphasis and the Buddhist somato-sensory 
emphasis will be discussed later.  
Moreover  a certain caveat is in order regarding certain instances of Aristotle’s ‘good 
man.’ His Magnificent Man, described in Book IV, 2, and his Magnanimous or ‘Great-
souled’  Man,  described  in  IV,  3,  evince  features  that  would  not  be  found  wholly 
admirable to-day. When we consider great philanthropists of modern times, for example, 
Andrew Carnegie or Bill Gates, they differ markedly in emphasis from counterparts of 
Aristotle, which he could count on his fellow-Athenians to recognise,. The Magnificent 
Man spends large sums of money on the kinds of public benefactions which require such 
expenditure: a warship for the navy; sponsoring dramatic performances at festivals, and 
the like.   But though Aristotle is careful to point out that the Magnificent Man is not 
ostentatious or vulgar, he still comes across as perhaps too much concerned with his own   25 
credit and honour to strike us as entirely admirable. We might feel this even more so, as 
Hughes points out, in the case of the Magnanimous Man:  
[He] justifiably sees himself as a Great Man, and is justifiably concerned with being 
honoured as such, and appropriately pleased when such honours are bestowed on 
him. He is above the petty concerns of more ordinary mortals, towards whom he is 
effortlessly superior; he speaks with a slow, calm and deep voice. [2001, p. 212] 
 
He further describes the preceding sense of strangeness in the middle of much that is 
familiar as reinforced, when he reminds us from Aristotle’s Politics: 
37 
 
[He] thought that women were incapable of public responsibility, and that some 
humans were natural slaves, or that menial work was somehow dehumanizing 
[2001, p. 213] 
 
How could Aristotle have got his facts so wrong?  What would he have made of women 
doing volunteer work with recovering drug addicts, or a woman like Mother Teresa, let 
alone all those women financiers or barristers?  Hughes makes the point that it is not 
simple prejudice on Aristotle’s part; he suggests that, as with children, whose upbringing 
is inadequate, Aristotle fails to make sufficient allowance for environmental and social 
influences, and is too ready to assume that differences are differences in natural abilities. 
[2001, p. 213] 
It has taken the slow maturing of the human race and growth of knowledge for our ideas 
about the abilities of women and children to change, just as it has our attitude to slavery. 
Nevertheless, some of the prejudices and beliefs of patriarchal cultures are still very alive 
in the contemporary world. In the developed countries, where the drive for change has 
been a mark of liberal democracies, great strides have been made with the founding of 
bodies such as the United Nations, to promote and try to safeguard human freedom and 
rights  on  a  universal  scale.  But,  despite  our  having  greater  factual  knowledge  than 
Aristotle about women, slaves, and children, as well as a gradual awareness of the need 
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for social justice,  some of the ‘blind spots’ of his times still apply to-day. To take one 
example, the prevalence of abuse of economic power, this is still greater with regard to 
women and children than with men: in the developed world this shows in patterns of 
employment;
38 in some parts of Africa  and the  Indian sub-continent it is women and 
children, in the main, who work for a pittance in conditions akin to slave-labour, while it 
is  women  in  South  America  who  constitute  the  underpaid  labour  force  of  the  multi-
national fashion industry. Moreover, consumers in the West, while perhaps not condoning 
these abuses, do not favour moves to pay higher, but fairer, prices.  
 
I have focussed on the importance of the doctrine of the mean for Aristotle as far as 
hitting the appropriate mark consistently is concerned. He will go on to consider how the 
person of practical wisdom arrives at correct moral judgements by applying the doctrine. 
But Hughes reminds us that Aristotle’s rationality is not any kind of moral mathematics:  
Central to moral philosophy as he sees it is the ordinary, everyday experience of 
trying to live a good life.  Aristotle is at pains to remind us that ethics is an inexact 
science.
39  He offers to give us some help; but not to give us rules or a formula 
which will produce solutions for practical decisions automatically.
40 
 
Aristotle placed the greatest importance on our nature as rational beings. This determines 
our  well-being  and  the  virtues  that  contribute  to  it.  Hughes  underlines  that  what 
differentiates Aristotle from other diverse conceptions of virtue ethics in our own day is 
his view of rationality as central to his account of human nature; he gives it the uppermost 
place in his ethics of virtue.  It marks his virtue ethics off from that arising from feminist 
psychoanalytic theory in the shape of ‘care ethics.’ One example of the latter that can be 
no more than acknowledged here, interesting though it is, is the work of Nel Noddings, 
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who is interested in playing down the role of reason and principles in ethics.
41 The pivotal 
role of rationality for Aristotle differentiates his virtue ethics also from that of character 
educators who wish to renew the emphasis on the importance of moral behaviour (I shall 
return to the latter in Chapter Five). 
42  
 
It is rationality which is central to Aristotle’s account of human nature, and hence of his 
ethics.  One’s  agency and reason shape one’s  world, a world  which,  for Aristotle, is 
founded  on  his  dualist  conception  of  ‘Self’  and  ‘Other.’  He  views  human  beings  as 
individual, separate, substantial entities. (The metaphysical differences between Aristotle 
and the Buddha regarding self and other will be discussed in Chapter Three). The virtues 
consist  of  the  moral  virtues,  which  equip  us  for  successful  social  relations  within  a 
civilized society, and of the intellectual virtues, which enable our successful engagement 
in rational enterprises. Aristotle compares the virtues to skills acquired through practice 
and habituation.  They are dispositions, arising from settled states of character, acquired 
largely by a process of practical and reflective training; the aim is to acquire a morally 
ordered, yet dynamic and changing engagement with the world. 
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Chapter Two 
Buddhist Ethics 
Almost two centuries before Aristotle the Buddha held that morality had its source in 
human  nature.
43  Aristotle’s  dualist  view  of  human  nature  and  his  belief  in  the 
superiority of mind over body led him to see morality as dependent largely on reason. 
The Buddha, on the other hand, saw morality as linked interdependently to meditation 
and insight or wisdom. One cannot be good without also being mindful and insightful.  
Similarly, according to the Buddha, in order to meditate, one must learn to be good 
and to seek wisdom.  Wisdom for the Buddhist always includes knowledge of the 
inner mind (as distinct from scientific knowledge) and, in striving for it, one has to 
both observe the ethical precepts and learn to meditate. Development in any one of 
the  three,  morality,  meditation,  or  insight/wisdom,  goes  hand  in  hand  with 
development in each of the other two.  
The Buddha’s main emphases in his ethics are on himself as the exemplar of karuna 
or  compassion  and  on  his  teaching  of  the  Noble  Eightfold  Path;  the  list  of  five 
precepts followed later. As already mentioned, for progress to be made on the Path, 
all three components – sila or morality, samadhi or meditative culture, and prajna or 
insight – must be combined in practice.  The key-notions of Buddhism are ‘the three 
marks of existence’: annica or impermanence, dukkha or suffering, anatta or no-self; 
together with nirvana they make up the ‘four seals of existence.’  These doctrines are 
central to its ethics and will be discussed later.  Here I will begin with an examination 
of the Buddha’s claims concerning rebirth, karma, and nirvana.  Despite the Buddha’s 
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constant setting aside of metaphysical questions,
44 these three claims are still central 
to understanding his doctrines.  
Reincarnation and rebirth are the starting point of Paul Edwards’ Reincarnation: A 
Critical Examination.
45   Reincarnation is the belief that human beings do not, as 
frequently  supposed  in  the  West,  live  only  once,  but  on  the  contrary  live  many, 
perhaps an infinite number of lives, acquiring a new body for each incarnation. This 
belief comes in many forms. Many believers in reincarnation hold that human beings 
always transmigrate into human bodies; all their previous incarnations were in human 
bodies and the same is true of all their future lives. Good examples include Rudolf 
Steiner’s anthroposophical followers in the West, and Hindu believers in the East. 
However, it has also been widely held by others – Jainists, and Native Americans –
that the body into which a person transmigrates is not necessarily another human 
body, it can be that of an animal, a plant or even an inanimate object. 
The Buddha, like any  Indian teacher contemporary with him, taught a concept of 
rebirth that was consistent with the common notion of a series of related lives over a 
very long period; he himself referred to his past lives.  However, his  notion was 
distinct  from  others;  since  he  held  the  doctrine  that  there  is  no  permanent  and 
unchanging self, there can be no transmigration in the usual sense.  Buddhism teaches 
that what is reborn is not the person but that one moment gives rise to another; it is 
that momentum which continues, even after death.  However, the commonly assumed 
view of reincarnation presupposes belief in an eternal soul; it follows that, without an 
eternal soul there can be no reincarnation.  Daniel Vokey contrasts the latter notion of 
reincarnation, as expressed by Edwards, with the Mahayana-Vajrayana tradition, in 
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which  there  is  no  self  to  be  reborn,  so  it  does  not  presume  a  soul,  eternal  or 
otherwise.
46    What  Mahayana  Buddhism  presents  is  the  notion  of  energy  or 
consciousness that is transmitted from one incarnation to the next; such a concept of 
reincarnation  reflects  the  Buddhist  concept  of  personality  existing,  even  in  one’s 
lifetime,  without  a  “soul,”  which  will  be  discussed  later  in  this  chapter.    Lynken 
Ghose points out that many have asked how Buddhism could have the notion that 
there is no permanent, independent self, and still believe in rebirth. Among the many 
explanations offered by thinkers, he suggests the following as one of the best: 
Only energy passes from one life to the next. Buddhist literature expresses this 
idea in the example of the two candles.  The lit candle represents this life; the
 
unlit candle represents the next life.  The lit candle lights the unlit candle and is 
extinguished.  Analogously, karma is passing along in this stream of energy 
from life to life.
47     
 
It  is  not  easy  to  find  a  clear  account  of  the  law  of  karma  which  is  linked  to 
reincarnation and rebirth.  The following quotation provides a stand-alone definition:
  
The  doctrine  maintains  that  the  world  is  just,  and  justice  is  equated  with 
retribution.  Everything good that happens to a human being is a reward for 
some previous good deed, and everything bad that happens is punishment for an 
evil deed.
48 
 
It is a definition which implies that for every moral question, for example, “Is this a 
good act?” there is a clear-cut and objectively valid answer.  A person is punished for 
his wrong acts and rewarded for those which are right, and there can be no debate or 
doubt about the wrongness or rightness of the acts.   
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To this view it can be objected, firstly, that many philosophers, for example, Ayer,
49 
Stevenson,
50 and Mackie,
51 deny that moral judgements can ever be objectively valid; 
secondly, even if their objectivity is not open to question, it is frequently true that 
decent, intelligent people will disagree about what a correct answer might be. Since 
the difficulty of the issue of universality with regard to Aristotle’s ethics has already 
been highlighted in Chapter One, it will now be assumed, for the sake of argument, 
that  universality  claims  are  generally  contentious,  and  I  will  go  on  to  confront 
stronger objections to the law of karma. 
Firstly, though the comparison is often made, the law of karma is not like “natural” 
laws.    For  example,  from  its  retrospective  analysis  we  cannot  judge  the  future 
consequences of an action, and thus it has no predictive value. Neither does Darwin’s 
theory of natural selection. Edwards does not press the latter point but presents a more 
basic consideration:  
Scientific laws and all statements that are not empty are not compatible with 
anything  that  may  happen……  Just  like  Boyle’s  law  or  the  second  law  of 
thermodynamics, Darwin’s theory of natural selection is not compatible with 
anything.  The  law  of  karma  on  the  other  hand  is  compatible  with  anything 
….and hence totally empty.
52 
 
‘Empty’ in this context refers to the law having only a non-directive capacity.  It fails 
Popper’s  falsifiability  criterion,  so  it  cannot  be  a  science.    The  same  is  true,  for 
Popper, of Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis; both are empty.
53 By comparison, 
Boyle’s  law,  “For  a  fixed  mass  of  ideal  gas  at  fixed  temperature,  the  product  of 
pressure and volume is a constant”, directs us to understand our ‘world’ in a particular 
way:  it refers us to a set of particulars: pressure, temperature, volume, and the notion 
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of a constant and how they react together. Edwards stresses that, when the proponents 
of karma “explain” the misfortunes that befall apparently decent human beings as a 
consequence of their sins in a previous life, such “wisdom after the event” is very 
different from the real wisdom after the event that we often obtain as a result of 
empirical investigation and the observation of causal relations.  For example, if a train 
crashes on the West Coast line and on investigation we find evidence that sections of 
the line had not been in order, possibly some of the points were not in the correct 
position or some were lying on the line, or the last scheduled inspection of the line 
had finished prematurely and short of that spot, then we can say that, had we known 
of these circumstances, we could have predicted the crash and avoided its subsequent 
occurrence.  But this is not generally how things happen.  More usually we examine 
the scene after the event and draw up lessons for next time.  The law of karma refers 
to everything, to all actions and all inactions, to all particulars and to no particulars at 
the same time. The karmic explanation may also be post hoc but it does not provide 
genuine wisdom after the event: we might be able to learn from the analysis of the 
event how and where the person had sinned, but we are unable to determine whether 
or not they are likely to suffer in a future life or how we might prevent them so doing. 
There  is  no  information  corresponding  to  the  information  obtained  by  the  crash 
investigators about the points’ failure.  
All adherents to the law of karma maintain that it operates autonomously.  Given this 
is the case, Edwards raises two separate but important lines of questioning.  How, in 
what way, and to whom are good and bad deeds registered?  And, even considering 
the law of karma as a cosmically instantiated principle, what determines what will   33 
happen to a person in his/her next incarnation as a result of the balance of his/her acts 
in any given life?
54   
Suppose  we  take  a  natural  disaster  such  as  the  tsunami  on  Boxing  Day,  2004. 
Someone who does not believe in karma would view it as a natural phenomenon that 
is entirely explicable in terms of geological and climatic causes.  On the other hand, 
somebody who does believe in karma, must be ready to claim that the tidal wave was 
brought  about  in  order  to  punish  or  reward  the  various  people  who  suffered  or 
benefited from its event.  Since it is claimed that the law of karma is infallible, it 
never  punishes  the  innocent  and  never  spares  the  guilty.    This  gives  rise  to  the 
metaphysical  question:  How  did  this  non-intelligent  principle  determine  the 
geological  conditions,  whose  existence  is  empirically  established  as  the  “natural” 
cause of the disaster, so as to achieve the desired results with complete precision? The 
karmic law would seem to offer a flawless explanation in the absence of evidence, on 
every occasion one applies it.  
Nirvana  is  the  next  Buddhist  concept  to  be  considered.  The  culmination  of  the 
Buddha’s psychological and spiritual journey, it refers to two kinds of blissful state.  
Firstly, the state reported by the Buddha and others who have been ‘awakened’ or 
enlightened  in  ‘this-life  nirvana’  is  brought  about  through  the  destruction  of  the 
‘impurities’  and  ‘defilements’  by  the  practice  of  generosity,  compassion,  and 
mindfulness  in  daily  life,  and  cultivated,  above  all,  by  the  exercise  of  insight 
meditation.  This-life  nirvana  is  characterised  by  a  consciousness  which  is  not,  as 
frequently supposed, absent – it is altered. It resonates with the Aristotelian ideal state 
of eudaimonia in its joy, harmony and contentment but Buddhist practitioners claim 
to  go  beyond  such  a  state  of  consciousness  in  the  higher  reaches  of  meditation; 
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accounts of such meditation  describe the dissolution of what we might conceive of as 
the inner and outer boundaries of consciousness.
55 This altered state of consciousness 
is the Buddhist prajna.   The English translation of prajna   as ‘insight’ refers to the 
power of seeing with the eyes of understanding beneath the surface of things, but it 
conveys  only  a  partial  sense  of  what  prajna  can  be  thought  to  mean.    Another 
frequent  translation  is  ‘wisdom’  but  prajna  is  closer  in  meaning  to  a  kind  of 
discriminating  knowledge.    As  the  faculty  which  grasps  the  truth  of  Buddhist 
teachings, it resembles the Greek concept of ‘nous,’ that is, an intuitive faculty of 
apprehension of the fundamental principles of reality. However, the state of Buddhist 
meditative insight, in which the latter truths are grasped, is one of non-discursive 
heightened awareness rather than the Greek state of an intuitive grasp of principles by 
a pure intellect. The enlightened Buddha claimed that this-life nirvanic experience 
gave him insight into the doctrine of Dependent Origination, the Four Noble Truths, 
and knowledge of how suffering may be overcome by following the Noble Eightfold 
Path until one is cleansed of ‘the defilements.’  (All these are to be discussed later.) 
The second kind of nirvanic state may be attained only by a human being who has 
attained  this-life  nirvana.    In  the  latter  case  the  five  skandhas  or  aggregates  that 
constitute individuality remain, and one is still subject to the possibility of suffering 
and  the  effect  of  previous  karma.    Upon  enlightenment  one  now  enjoys  right 
understanding and right views about the truths of existence, like the Buddha. When, 
after  possibly  many  lives,  one  maintains  the  state  of  this-life  nirvana,  pursuing 
perfectly the Noble Eightfold Path in all three dimensions (morality, meditation and 
insight) it is claimed that, at the moment of physical death, post-death nirvana is 
attained.  This marks the complete end of suffering; there can no longer be karmic 
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rebirth  into  samsara  or  the  continued  cycle  of  existence.  On  death  the  fully 
enlightened Buddhist is said to attain parinirvana, the final blissful state. The account 
of the scholarly tradition of the Buddha’s post-death nirvana is that, with no further 
rebirth possible, he transcends consciousness as normally understood, and grasps the 
‘ultimate reality of things.’  It is interesting that the Buddha himself refused to answer 
the question as to the status of the enlightened person after his or her death; in a rather 
old section of the Pali Canon, he replies: 
When a person has gone out, then there is nothing by which you can measure 
him.  That by which he can be talked about is no longer there for him; you 
cannot say that he does not exist.  When all ways of being, all phenomena are 
removed, then all ways of description have been removed.
56 
 
The conception of Mahayana Buddhism regarding nirvana has an additional slant, that 
of a ‘non-abiding nirvana;’ this is attained by the Bodhisattva path of liberating all 
sentient beings from suffering.
57 This also involves a form of nondual consciousness 
which cannot be described conceptually; once more it is not consciousness of some 
absolute reality, or some reality which is inherently self-existent. There is nothing but 
a ‘pure radiant flow’ of experiences.
58  
For Edwards, nirvana is a kind of ‘Absolute’ or ‘Cosmic Consciousness.’ Mikulas
59 
refers to it as ‘universal consciousness.’ For Vokey, on the other hand, one of the key 
tenets of his Mahayana-Vajrayana Buddhist tradition is that nirvana is “beyond all 
concepts.”
60 Unlike the rational knowledge of first principles attained by Aristotle’s 
‘contemplative  man,’  the  knowledge  attained  in  nirvana  is  non-propositional  and 
cannot be described, far less conceptualised.  
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There is a common misconception in the West that Buddhism requires an end to all 
desire,  both  positive  and  negative,  and  this  misconception  arises  from  the  literal 
meaning of nirvana, ‘blown out.’ The usual Buddhist image is the ‘extinction’ of a 
fire  or  a  flame.    In  ‘Understanding  Buddhism’  Schmidt-Leukel  emphasises  that 
nirvana refers to the extinction of all the unwholesome factors in life.  This means the 
extinction of craving and ignorance, of attachment,
61 greed, hatred, and delusion, of 
any identification with the five aggregates as one’s self as well as the extinction of all 
the  results  consequent  on  any  of  them:  suffering  and,  on  death,  continual  karmic 
rebirth  into  samsara  or  the  cycle  of  existence.
62  While  nirvana  in  the  sense  of 
extinction  is  meant  to  be  taken  literally,  a  metaphor  often  used  to  describe  it  is 
liberation, and this better conveys the release it offers from the suffering inherent in 
the cycle of transitory existence.  
On his first ‘awakening’ or enlightenment the Buddha is said to have obtained insight 
into the doctrine of Dependent Origination. This is the principle which claims that 
everything  arises  through  dependence  on/conditioned  by  something  else.  This  is 
expressed in various ways, such as, with X as a condition, Y arises; because X exists, 
then Y arises; and through X, Y is conditioned.  The statement ‘X exists’ begs the 
question of how X comes to exist in the first place.  Western science is prepared to 
raise this question and attempt several hypotheses in response, although it does not, of 
course, purport to have a final answer to aetiological questions.   
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Mikulas states that the most influential model for cognitive science in the US has 
been  an  information-processing,  computer-simulation  model.
63  He  offers  us  an 
alternative  in  behaviours  of  the  mind,  derived  from  the  third  Buddhist  literary 
collection,  the  abhidhamma,  which  he  argues  offers  stronger  implications  for 
education,  therapy,  sports,  and  art.  In  describing  the  abhidhamma  or  ‘ultimate 
teaching’ he likens it to ‘Buddhist psychology:’  
This  Buddhist  cognitive  science  includes  a  detailed  dissection  of  mental 
processes and experiences, plus an explanation of how they all fit together.  
On  the  practical  side,  it  is  held  that  this  analysis  can  facilitate  the 
development of prajna or insight, and it is the basis for some meditation 
practices.
 [Mikulas, 2007, p.22] 
 
In the abhidhamma the dissection of mental processes and experiences is into 
dhammas  or  elementary  essences  of  conscious  reality.    A  dhamma  is  an 
irreducible  atom  of  experience,  such  as  a  single  characteristic  or  quality,  for 
example, a triad of dhammas is related to feeling: pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. 
What is constantly forming together and passing away is referred to in Buddhism 
as the  five skandhas; the Sanskrit term is literally translated  as ‘heaps’, more 
commonly  as  ‘aggregates’  or  ‘building  blocks’  in  English.  The  skandhas  are 
collections  of  dhammas  that  comprise  entities  such  as  a  person.    The  five 
skandhas are form (elements of matter, the five physical senses and their objects), 
feeling, perception, (discernment of an object, beginning of concept formation), 
mental  formations,  (mental  contents  other  than  feeling  and  perception),  and 
consciousness.  
In  the  most  popular  version  of  dependent  origination  there  are  twelve  links  in  a 
circular chain, with every link depending on the previous link.  The twelve links are 
ignorance, formations, consciousness, name and form, six senses, contact, feeling, 
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craving, grasping, becoming, birth, and death.
64 In summary, the Buddha teaches that 
everything  conditioned is subject to impermanence  and decay, thus reminding his 
followers of the inseparability as well as the mortality of all sentient beings.   
Schmidt-Leukel  points  out  that  the  Buddha's  insight  into  the  doctrine  of   
Dependent  Origination  at  the  time  of  his  enlightenment  necessitates   
that, if nirvana is what the Buddha described as ‘The Deathless,’
65 nirvana must be an 
unconditioned reality:  
Only  if  there  really  is  such  an  unconditioned  reality,  is  liberation  from  the 
conditioned existence of samsara possible. 
Understanding Nirvana as an unconditioned reality not only entails that it is 
truly deathless but implies as well that it is not simply a mental state…  Thus 
the state of the enlightened person must be understood as the  attainment or 
perception  of  an  unconditioned  reality  which  exists  independently  from  this 
achievement.
66   
 
Despite describing the nirvanic state as indescribable, the Buddhist tradition has used 
countless positive metaphors in an effort to comprehend it. These include: liberation, 
ultimate bliss, freedom, unconditioned awareness, transcendence, shelter, and so on. 
Vokey adds: 
As a philosopher of education, I find it useful to consider the significance of 
different accounts of the fruition of the spiritual path for the path itself. If there 
is agreement on how to practice, then differences between attempts to define the 
undefinable I think are not so important.
67 
 
Damien  Keown
68  and  Schmidt-Leukel
69  both  agree  about  Buddhist  notions  of 
attachment  and  non-attachment.  As  mentioned  briefly  earlier,  it  is  often  thought, 
mistakenly, that the Buddha wanted us to annihilate desire. On the contrary, it is a 
matter of distinguishing positive from negative desire.  For example, non- obsessional 
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striving for nirvana always arises from a positive desire, whereas obsessional striving 
for nirvana arises from a negative desire. Attempts at translating the Buddhist term 
tanha into English use ‘attachment,’ ‘craving’ and ‘addiction,’ as synonyms to refer 
to any grasping action (including thinking) which arises from a negative desire. This 
is unlike the positive connotation normally associated in English usage with the term 
‘attachment.’ Lust, that is, a desire for extreme sensuous pleasure, is frequently cited 
as an attachment to be overcome; it is to be reduced until finally rooted out.  One is 
enjoined  to  strive  for  non-attachment  from  all  negative  desires  such  as  anger  or 
hatred, possessive clinging to an idea, a person or an object, and so on. This attitude 
of non-attachment is also meant to apply to the Buddha’s anatta or no-self teaching 
which underpins his ethic.  
Clinging/being attached to the five aggregates or constituents of individual existence 
usually shows itself in the thought or attitude of ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my 
self (atta).’
70  The Buddhist tradition relates that the Buddha, shortly after his first 
sermon  following  his  enlightenment,  in  which  he  taught  the  Four  Noble  Truths, 
exhorted his first followers to cultivate an attitude of non-attachment towards that 
which we usually see as constituting our very own self by the thought, ‘This is not 
mine, this I am not, this is not my self (anatta).’
71 
The  Buddha  stresses  the  practical  and  spiritual  dimension  of  his  central  ‘no-self’ 
teaching by highlighting that the cultivation of an attitude of non-attachment towards 
the  notion  of  myself  as  a  substantial,  separate,  and  permanent  entity  leads  to 
‘disenchantment’ and ‘liberation.’  As conducive to non-attachment he enjoins on his 
followers the negative insight he gained upon his enlightenment. It has three aspects: 
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All  things  within  samsaric  experience  should  be  regarded  as  impermanent 
(anicca), as incapable of providing lasting satisfaction (dukkha), and as being 
‘not the self’ (anatta).
72 
 
The Buddha’s “three marks” of existence are always given in this order when recited, 
marking  an  ascending  scale  of  difficulty,  with  the  doctrine  of  anatta  or  ‘no-self’ 
coming last, a concept that sounds most unfamiliar to western ears. The first mark, 
impermanence, is characteristic of both dukkha and anatta and will not be discussed 
separately.  However,  I  will  examine  the  third mark,  anatta,  before  discussing  the 
second mark of existence, dukkha or suffering; for the Buddha, it is precisely one’s 
lack of understanding of the significance of ‘no-self’ which is responsible for much of 
one’s suffering.   
Theravada Buddhism teaches that there is no independent or permanent self/soul.
73 
There is no equivalent idea in Western psychology; indeed work in cognitive therapy 
as well as psychotherapy is generally built upon the notion of a substantial, permanent 
entity which is referred to as the self.  A notion of the self as a self-existent entity has 
long been held in the main in Western philosophy, from Plato and Aristotle onwards. 
Certainly in the twentieth century the ideas of Derek Parfit
74 and Galen Strawson
75 on 
the self have many points in common with the Theravada Buddhist notion of no-self.  
However, it is the eighteenth century ideas of David Hume on the self that resonate 
most  strongly  with  this  Buddhist  conception  of  no-self.    D.  W.  Murray  exposits 
Hume’s notion of the self as follows: “When Hume first addressed the question of 
personal identity he stated: 
There  are  some  philosophers  who  imagine  we  are  every  moment  intimately 
conscious  of  what  we  call  our  'self’:  that  we  feel  its  existence  and  its 
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continuance  in  existence:  and  are  certain,  beyond  the  evidence  of 
demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity.
76  
 
After inviting us to consider our real experience, Hume continues:  
Unluckily,  all  these  positive  assertions  are  contrary  to  that  very  experience 
which is pleaded for them: nor have we any idea of 'self,' after the manner here 
explained. For, from what impression could this idea be derived?
 77  
 
For Hume, the idea of a "continuous self" was fantastic. There was nothing beneath 
the ideas to connect them. When Hume speaks of perceptions, he notes:  
All  these  are  different,  and  may  be  separately  considered,  and  may  exist 
separately, and have no need of anything to support their existence. After what 
manner therefore do they belong to self, and how are they connected with it? 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what 1 call 'myself,' 1 always 
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, 
love or hatred, pain or pleasure. 1 can never catch 'myself’ at any time without a 
perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. [1975(1758):1, 
VI, iv]
 78 
 
Hume observes that we never experience our own self, only the continuous chain of 
our  experiences  themselves.    This  psychological  reality  leads  Hume  to  the 
metaphysical conclusion that the self is an illusion, and that in fact personal identity is 
nothing but the continuous succession of perceptual experiences.  This renders his 
account of the self a closer parallel to Buddhist notions of impermanence and no-self 
than any other western philosophical counterpart. 
Mahayana Buddhism offers a critique of the Theravada notion of the five aggregates, 
as it warns against seeing these aggregates as representing or possessing a self/soul. 
This version also seems to be re-stating the Theravada doctrine of no-self differently, 
in that we are all said to be “empty” of a permanent, independently existing self. 
Michael Barnes elucidates the Buddhist notion of ‘being’ as follows:
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For the Buddhist all of reality is interdependent, all things arising and flowing 
together within the single ever-transient nexus of becoming and passing away. 
There is no ‘moment’ of creation in Buddhism and no creator who is somehow 
outside  or  independent  of  the  process  of  becoming.    Indeed  to  speak  of 
‘independence’ in any way would be to contradict the whole Buddhist ethos that 
is so securely rooted, not in any story of origins, but in mindfulness of the here 
and now. Thus Buddhism seeks to avoid any account of reality which sets up a 
dualism  of  the  ‘invisible’  Real  somehow  lurking  behind  the  visible 
phenomena.
79  
 
However, the alternative for Mahayana Buddhism is not nihilism but the concept of 
sunyata or ‘emptiness.’  This too has also led to puzzlement and misunderstanding, 
especially in the West, perhaps because of its very succinctness. The great Tibetan 
philosopher Tsongkhapa says that emptiness is the track on which the centred person 
moves,
80 and by this he means that the concept of emptiness is a short-hand for the 
infinite depth and elusiveness of things. But rather counter-intuitively, to speak of the 
emptiness of things is not to speak of nothing. The question is – what are things 
‘empty of’? And the Buddhist answer is ‘empty of own-being,’ that is, empty of self-
existent reality. Nothing exists independent of anything else. There is, therefore, ‘no 
thing’, no inherently existent reality that can be separated from every other ‘thing’. 
Everything is part of one interdependent continuum of being.  
In  dealing  with  Buddhist  notions  regarding  the  self  and  no-self  in  Chapter  5  of 
Religion and Human Nature (1998), Keith Ward examines the claim, from a Buddhist 
perspective, that all sentient beings are what might be called process-selves, before  
he  explores  the  latter  notion  from  a  Western  philosophical  perspective.
81  For  the 
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Buddhist, human beings do not have a special ‘soul’ that all other animals lack. But 
the form of subjectivity in human beings is such that it makes liberation possible, in a 
way that it is not for non-human animals. It is human beings who can learn the truth 
of anicca and dukkha who can practise right thought, action, and meditation, and who 
can achieve the state of no desire for anything negative or unwholesome. This is 
because the degree of conceptual understanding, self-knowledge, and mental control 
possible  for  humans  is  much  greater  than  for  non-human  animals  which,  our 
knowledge to date leads us to believe, are largely bound by sense-perception and 
instinct. 
The Buddhist thus constructs the idea that a person is a ‘process-self,’ namely: 
A discrete succession of free acts, cognitive states, and dispositions, closely 
correlated, in continual flux, and united to one another by the logically primitive 
relation of co-consciousness.
82 
  
The Buddha teaches that such succession is driven by negative desire or attachment, 
and that it inevitably results in suffering of three main kinds –bodily pain, mental 
pain, and intellectual suffering consequent on the realization that impermanence and 
enthralment to causal conditions are imperfections.
83  
When desire is extinguished, suffering ceases, and the flow of experience can be 
seen in a very different way, even in this life.  Where this is perfected and 
enlightenment  achieved,  with  no  further  rebirth  possible,  consciousness  can 
expand  to  embrace  knowledge  and  experience  radiant  realms  of  being,  and 
comes to have that character of freedom and bliss which can be characterized as 
nirvana.
84 
 
With regard to this notion of the self as such a succession, Ward agrees that it is 
different  from  any  idea  of  the  self  as  a  permanent  and  unchanging  substance. 
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However he asks if it doesn’t presuppose the idea of the self as a subject of action and 
experience; if the belief that there is unconditioned awareness and freedom doesn’t 
presuppose  that  there  is  something  more  to  human  beings  than  just  a  bundle  of 
nameable aggregates, something ‘more’ which is a subject?
85 He answers both these 
questions affirmatively by arguing that the process-self is one agent which continues 
from moment to moment, whose continuing activity of knowing is what makes co-
conscious states apprehensible
86as members of one consciousness. This is comparable 
to Derek Parfit’s notion of ‘Closest Continuer.’
87 What is uniting the states is the 
subject itself.  
 It can be said that I, the subject and agent of knowledge, remember, intend, and feel, 
and thus I actively connect various events within one consciousness.
88 I cannot feel 
guilty if I have no idea of having done an act which would have been deemed wrong, 
and which I need not have done.  Culpability involves a very complex set of beliefs, 
not only those imported into the interpretation of the feeling but also those social and 
cultural beliefs which contribute to the beliefs in the first place. 
Conscious  experience  is  essentially  active,  and  requires  a  discriminating, 
recognizing, and evaluating agent, which is the subject of all events, which are 
members of one consciousness. 
89 
 
Ward agrees with Hume that one cannot observe this subject enduring,
90 but he differs 
from Hume when the latter claims that, if I apprehend myself as an active element in 
every one of a series of mental acts, then I must conceive of myself as the same agent, 
to the extent that mental acts are members of the same consciousness. What grounds 
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are there for believing it is the same subject through all change? Process implies 
temporal endurance; if I have long-term intentions, for example, to write a thesis, then 
that intention is spread out over a long time, and it is the same subject who first forms 
the  intention,  then  sustains,  and  at  last  completes  it  in  a  finished  action.  Ward’s 
instance  is  of  writing  a  symphony,  but  my  own  example  has  greater  personal 
resonance.
91 Ward reiterates that where a Buddhist holds a view of a process-self, this 
is not equivalent either to a view that there is no self at all (annihilationism) or to a 
view  which  holds  there  is  one  unchanging  and  indestructible  self,  beyond  the 
temporal flow (eternalism). 
The  process-self  which  lies  between  these  two  extremes  is  a  dynamic, 
ceaselessly active subject, its content in constant change. It is prone to egoistic 
attachments,  but  can  also  be  free  to  participate  in  the  flow  of  ideas  and 
perceptions without such attachment, acting with compassion and without self-
regard. 
92 
 
Such a Buddhist account of anatta or no-self does not hold that there is nothing to be 
egoistic about, that is, no ego.  It holds that there is no permanent, inherently existing, 
isolated self: 
There is only the transient flow of interdependent selves-in-relation………. free 
to move into the future by continual interaction and exchange of information –
or bound by attachment to the past, by mutual hostility and isolated secrecy. 
93  
 
The  remaining  ‘mark  of  existence’,  dukkha,  which  formed  part  of  the  Buddha’s 
negative insight on his enlightenment, is the last foundational doctrine to be examined   
here.  In practice, it is linked to the two other marks, impermanence and the absence 
of an inherently existing self.  The Buddhist term dukkha means acute poison (a literal 
translation),  suffering,  or  unsatisfactoriness;  suffering  is  one  of  the  fundamental 
characteristics of everything that comes to pass in the world.  Buddhist texts mention 
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three  kinds  of  suffering:    suffering  due  to  change,  physical  suffering,  and  an  all 
pervasive  unsatisfactoriness  (the  last  kind  of  suffering  is  most  often  translated  by 
‘anxiety’  in  western  Buddhism,  particularly  in  the  United  States).    I  will  restrict 
myself to the use of ‘suffering’ as the most practical, all-round translation in English. 
Mikulas refers to the “confusions and confounding” that are part of dukkha; young 
people, for example, are particularly susceptible to these kinds of anxieties in the face 
of adult behaviour which contradicts what they have been taught as children. The 
overall cause of dukkha is referred to as tanha, literally, ‘thirst’, but it has already 
been  pointed  out  previously  that  it  is  more  accurately  rendered  in  translation  by 
metaphors  such  as  craving,  addiction,  or  attachment.  Any  prevailing  desire  which 
shows  itself  obsessively  in  regard  of  a  person,  idea,  or  thing,  is  understood  by  a 
Buddhist as tanha or attachment.  
The overall structure of Buddhist theory and practice is the Four Noble Truths which 
arose as part of Siddartha Gautama’s enlightenment on becoming a ‘Buddha’ or an 
‘awakened’ one.  They became known as the Buddha’s first major discourse and the 
fourfold structure parallels medical practice of his day:  
          (i) Diagnose a disease –recognizing the reality of dukkha or suffering due to the  
insecurity of life of all sentient beings.  
 
(ii) Identify its cause –the fundamental, internal causes of suffering, which are 
identified as tanha or craving, dosa or hostility, and moha or delusion. 
 
(iii) Determine whether it is curable –realizing the possibility of the cessation of 
suffering and its source.   
 
(iv) Outline a course of treatment to cure it –following the path of spiritual 
purification  and  transformation  that  results  in  such  freedom,  the  Noble 
Eightfold  Path,  so  that  one  is  at  peace  and  fully  in  the  present,  not  merely 
apathetic and unemotional.  Behaviour becomes more motivated by compassion 
than by grasping for security. 
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Buddhist psychology understands that the basic nature of people is sane, clear, and 
good but also that it is obscured by ‘the impurities’ and ‘the defilements’ or ‘three 
poisons of the mind’ mentioned above: craving, hostility, and delusion.  To recover 
our innate good nature, we have to free ourselves of the ‘three poisons.’ How does the 
Buddha propose  we free ourselves from them  and thus of tanha or craving?  By 
pursuing the Fourth Noble Truth, that is, following the Eightfold Path:  
First is right understanding, that is, understanding the situation one is in, for 
example, the four noble truths and three marks of existence (impermanence, 
suffering, and not-self), and resolving to do something about it.
94  
          Second is right thought, including no lust, ill-will, or cruelty. 
 
Third is right speech, including being constructive and helpful and avoiding 
lying, gossip and vanity. 
Fourth  is  right  action,  including  being  moral,  compassionate,  precise,  and 
aware, and avoiding aggression.  
Fifth is right livelihood, not creating suffering.  
 
Sixth is right effort, actually doing what should be done. 
Seventh and Eighth are right mindfulness and right concentration.
95   
 
Viewing the steps on the Path as a whole, the eight components are seen as both 
interrelated and interdependent. All eight factors exist at two basic levels, the ordinary 
(for lay-people) and the transcendent (for monks and nuns), so that generally there is 
both an ordinary and a Noble Eightfold Path.
96  Most Buddhists seek to practise the 
ordinary Path, which is perfected only in those who are approaching the lead up to 
what is designated as ‘stream-entry’. At the latter point a person gains a first glimpse 
of nirvana and may enter the ‘stream’ leading there, the Noble Eightfold Path.
97  
                                                 
94 The question arises, how are we to judge what is ‘right understanding,’ but the Buddha says nothing 
in this respect.  
95 Mikulas, op. cit. p.12 
96 The form of the Path immediately leading up to becoming an Arahat or enlightened saint in 
Theravada Buddhism has two extra factors, right knowledge and right freedom.  
 95 Harvey [1990]  p. 68 
 
 
   48 
The Eightfold Path does not represent eight distinct stages through which we must 
pass sequentially; we become finally ‘awakened’ by progressive purification within 
each of the areas. Progress on the Path resembles movement in a spiral direction 
(which often bends back, recursively, on itself), rather than movement in a linear 
direction. The three groups, in which the steps fall, are presented to the  practitioner 
as  the  three  Buddhist  ‘jewels’  or  principles,  which  are  usually  ordered  in  the 
following way to denote the logical stages of acquisition as distinct from the spiral of 
practice: sila, morality, samadhi, meditative cultivation, and prajna, insight/wisdom.  
I shall discuss sila first as it is the basis of all Buddhist practice.  The first section in 
this threefold division of the Eightfold Path, entitled ‘virtue’ or ‘morality’, comprises 
three factors: right speech, right action and right livelihood.  Buddhist ethics has been 
summarised by B. Alan Wallace on the website of his Santa Barbara Institute for 
Consciousness Studies thus: “Avoid inflicting harm on yourself or others, and be of 
service  when  the  opportunity  presents  itself.”  The  following  are  the  five  precepts 
attached to the fourth factor of right action: Do not kill, do not steal, do not lie, do not 
be unchaste, do not take intoxicants. The first four are reminiscent of four of the 
Decalogue’s commandments; the fifth is intended as an aid to meditative practices. It 
is  worth  noting  that  a  fixed  attachment  to  ethical  precepts  is  seen  as  a  hindering 
‘fetter’ by the Buddha.
98 Each Path-factor conditions skilful states, and progressively 
wears away its opposite ‘wrong’ factor, until all unskilful states are destroyed.
99  
The next principle to be discussed, insight or prajna, is always cited first, when the 
eight steps are named together, to show that it is the culmination of spiritual progress. 
However, it is always considered to be constituted as much by ‘right view or thinking’ 
as by  ‘right understanding.’  Achieving the crowning point of insight depends on 
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continuing to develop prajna simultaneously with the other two components, morality 
and meditative cultivation.   
Vokey’s characterization of the first component, right understanding, is in terms of 
Mahayana  non-dualistic  awareness  of  the  world,  prajna  or  insight.  It  has  been 
mentioned earlier that another expression used to capture its meaning in translation is 
intuitive wisdom (‘Wisdom Mind’ in North America). The question arises as to what 
is understood by ‘intuitive’ in this respect?  What is understood by nous in the Greek 
philosophical tradition –the intuitive apprehension by the mind or intellect alone –is 
included in what is understood by ‘intuitive wisdom’ in a Buddhist sense.  However,  
prajna is said to be attained in a state of heightened awareness which extends beyond 
the sphere of conceptual understanding to embrace a mystical kind of knowledge of 
the  Buddhist  truths.  In  discussing  D.T.  Suzuki’s  article,  ‘Reason  and  Intuition  in 
Buddhist Philosophy,’ Loy makes clear that it is unfortunate that ‘intuition’ has been 
used  in  the  West  to  translate  prajna,  since  this  term  is  commonly  understood  as 
referring  to  some  extra  faculty.
100  What  a  nondualistic  system  such  as  Mahayana 
Buddhism understands as intuitive wisdom is the function of the intellect, when it is 
experiencing nondually in meditation, that is, when it comes to understand ‘ultimate 
reality’  in  an  expanded,  altered  state  of  consciousness  which  cannot  be 
conceptualised.
101    The  Buddhist  meditator  accepts  the  limits  of  language  in 
attempting to convey this non-discursive state, even as it tries to express the ineffable.  
The  Buddhist  meditator  does  not  attempt  to  make  the  inchoate  choate.  It  was 
mentioned earlier in this chapter that prajna always includes knowledge of the inner 
mind as distinct from scientific knowledge.  
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According  to  Walpola  Rahula,  the  second  principle,  sati,  is  better  understood  as 
mental  culture  or  development  rather  than  meditation.    He  points  out  that  when 
bhavana or ‘meditation’ is mentioned, one too often thinks: 
[O]f being absorbed in some kind of mysterious trance or having an interest as 
in  yoga  in  gaining  some  spiritual  powers…..  Buddhist  meditation  aims  at 
cleansing the mind of impurities and disturbances and cultivating such qualities 
as concentration and energy, for example, leading finally to the attainment of 
highest wisdom, nirvana.
 102  
 
For  Rahula,  a  disciple  of  the  more  orthodox  Theravada  Buddhism,  Buddhist 
meditation  is  essentially  an  analytic  method  based  on  mindfulness,  awareness, 
vigilance, and observation. However, a Buddhist in the Mahayana-Vajrayana tradition 
of Vokey describes it rather as a meditative cultivation of heart/mind. To feel that 
there is no difference between the suffering of others and one’s own suffering, no 
difference between one’s own happiness and the happiness of others, is to be purely 
motivated  in  the  way  referred  to  as  bodhicitta,  that  is,  ‘The  Heart  of  the 
Enlightenment  Mind.’
103  The  last  two  components  on  the  Eightfold  Path,  right 
mindfulness  and  right  concentration  are  the  steps  whereby  its  followers  acquire 
insight and attain enlightenment. The penultimate step, sati or mindfulness, is the 
foundation  of  every  Buddhist  tradition.    The  most  important  discourse  which  the 
Buddha ever gave on ‘meditation’ is called ‘The Setting-up of Sati.’
104 This discourse 
is so highly venerated in tradition that it is regularly recited not only in Buddhist 
monasteries, but also in Buddhist homes because right Mindfulness (or Attentiveness) 
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is the keystone of meditation.  One is to be diligently aware, mindful and attentive 
with regard to what the Buddha described as the ‘Four Foundations of Mindfulness’: 
(1) the activities of the body, (2) sensations or feelings, (3) the activities of the mind, 
and (4) the objects of the mind, namely,  ideas, thoughts, conceptions, and things.
105   
Mindfulness in respect of the four areas covers a vast range of activities of various 
kinds.  In view of the possible audience I have in mind, aged six to sixteen years, it 
might be more helpful to concentrate initially on mindfulness in the areas of body and 
mind.  I will discuss it in relation to the latter areas in detail, but discuss it only briefly 
in relation to the other two areas, namely sensations and ideas.  I will begin with 
mindfulness in relation to sensations and ideas first, before focussing on mindfulness 
in relation to body and mind.  
Regarding sensations and feelings, Rahula indicates that one should be aware of all 
forms of feelings and sensations, pleasant, unpleasant, neutral, of how they appear 
and  disappear  within  oneself.    In  respect  of  the  fourth  area,  ideas,  thoughts, 
conceptions and things, one should know their nature, how they appear and disappear, 
how they are developed, how they are suppressed, and destroyed. 
106 
There are countless ways of developing mindful attentiveness in relation to the body - 
as modes of meditation – but I will illustrate with two of the most important only. The 
practice of concentration on breathing is one of the most well-known exercises in 
mental development related to the body.
107  Only in this meditation is a particular 
posture prescribed, that of sitting. One breathes in and out as usual, without any effort 
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or  strain.  Then  one  brings  one’s  mind  to  concentrate  on  one’s  breathing-in  and 
breathing-out;  lets one’s mind watch and observe one’s breathing in and out;  lets 
one’s mind be aware and vigilant of one’s breathing in and out. At the beginning it is 
extremely difficult to bring one’s mind to concentrate solely on one’s breathing but, 
when successful, the momentary experience of having one’s mind fully concentrated 
on one’s breathing induces calm. If practised regularly, what is initially only a fleeting 
experience will gradually be repeated for longer and longer periods, with associated 
longer periods of calm.  
An allied form of bodily attentiveness is to be aware of whatever one does, physically 
or verbally, during the daily routine: one should live in the present moment, in the 
present action: 
Mindfulness does not mean that one should think and be conscious ‘I am doing 
this’  or  ‘I  am  doing  that’.  The  moment  one  thinks  ‘I  am  doing  this’,  one 
becomes self-conscious, and then one does not live in the action but in the idea 
‘I  am,’  and  consequently  one’s  work  is  disturbed.  All  great  work  –  artistic,  
poetic, intellectual or spiritual – is produced at those moments when its creators 
forget  themselves  completely  in  their  actions  and  are  free  from  self-
consciousness.
 108   
 
With regard to the third area, attentiveness to the mind, Rahula points out that one 
should be fully aware of the fact whenever one’s mind is passionate or detached, 
whenever it is overcome by hatred, ill-will, jealousy, or is full of love, compassion, 
whenever  it  is  deluded  or  has  a  clear  and  right  understanding,  is  distracted  or 
concentrated, and so on.  He quotes the Buddha’s teaching: 
One should be bold and sincere and look at one’s own mind as one looks at 
one’s face in a mirror.
109  
 
                                                 
108 Op. cit., 72 
109 Op. cit., 73   53 
Rahula gives one example to illustrate how to observe one’s mind, not as a judge, but 
dispassionately: 
Suppose  one  is  really  angry,  overcome  by  anger,  ill-will,  hatred,  then, 
paradoxically,  one  is  not  really  aware  that  one  is  angry.  The  moment  one 
becomes aware and mindful of the state of one’s mind, the moment one sees the 
state for what it is, it becomes ‘ashamed,’ as it were, and begins to subside. One 
should examine its nature, how it appears and disappears. Once again, as was 
said with regard to being mindful of the present moment, it is not a case of 
thinking ‘I am angry’ or of ‘my anger.’ One should only be aware and mindful 
of the state of an angry mind. This should be the attitude with regard to all 
feelings, emotions and states of mind.
110  
 
In these most basic activities of the body and mind, the practice of mindfulness is 
meant  to  cultivate  clarity  of  mind:  for  one  to  become  aware  of  the  thoughts  and 
feelings that flood the mind in the process of everyday experience.  It is worth noting 
that there is more to meditative cultivation than clarity, important though that is: 
But mindfulness also allows the mind to become calm, ‘just as a lake becomes 
calm when there is no longer any wind to stir up its waters into waves’. The 
further purpose of this practice is to diminish harmful emotions and become 
more fully aware of the flow of reality that makes up the self and the world.
111  
 
On a higher level, an essential pre-requisite for the attainment of nirvana is the facility 
to calm the mind and allow its passions to cool. In a similar vein, in the Mahayana 
tradition, mindfulness is an essential pre-requisite for compassion as well as nirvana: 
as the mind becomes focused and calm, it is more possible to become attentive to the 
sufferings of others.  
The  preceding  account  of  mindfulness  claims  that  the  practice  of  mindfulness  is 
capable of inducing clarity and calm in body and mind; and that, where the mind is 
clear and stable, compassion emerges more readily.  None of these claims is able to 
draw on substantial experimental proof to date regarding their validity. To a great 
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extent they have depended on an attitude of willingness to ‘try and see.’  Recently, 
empirical research has begun to examine these claims and evidence is forthcoming, 
particularly in the medical domain. I will return to this aspect in Chapter Five. 
 
Mindfulness is the consciousness of, and attention to, experience here and now; our 
innate capability in everyday life to fix attention on a single object, whether of body, 
feeling, mind or thought. Vokey summarises aptly the everyday practice of sati as 
“the  spiritual  equivalent  of  physical  health.”
112  Sati  and  samadhi  (mental 
concentration, the ultimate step on the Path), applied together in meditation, form the 
essence of the Buddha’s teaching on meditative cultivation. Gowans underlines the 
claim  that  much  intellectual,  emotional,  and  moral  preparation  is  required  for 
meditation to be effective.  If we wish to acquire insightful knowledge of the most 
important Buddhist truths for ourselves: 
We must be prepared to undertake this Eightfold Path, a long, complex and 
difficult programme of training that involves epistemically important practices 
that culminate in meditation.
 113   
 
The notion of anatta has been mentioned already as depending on an acceptance of 
the doctrine that there is no substance-self, only a dependent process-self. For the 
Buddha the no-self doctrine undercuts the notion of 'I', 'my', 'mine' and so on, making 
it easier to reduce and finally let go of all negative desire, follow the ethical precepts, 
and be compassionate towards others. Similarly to his understanding of the Dhammas 
or  truths  of  nirvana,  dependent  origination,  and  the  Four  Noble  Truths,  which  he 
reached on his enlightenment, the Buddha did not consider the no-self teaching an 
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unresolved issue.  Like the preceding truths he had ‘awakened’ to it through his own 
experience in meditation. He taught that it would be unprofitable to speculate further 
on such issues, urging his followers, to take him as their model, grow in perfection 
through the discipline of following the Path, and thus attain insight/understanding for 
themselves of these truths. 
Gowans first considers that: 
If  explicit  and  extensive  rational  argumentation  were  the  only  avenue  to 
philosophic knowledge, then the Buddha’s teaching would fall very short of this 
knowledge. 
114 
 
Gowans next maintains that it is difficult to depict the Buddha’s position in terms of 
Western  notions  of  rationality,  since  the  most  important  avenue  to  acquiring  the 
knowledge he teaches, is not reason but meditation: 
The  idea  that  our  ultimate  well-being  or  salvation  requires  a  basic 
metamorphosis of our beliefs, feelings and values is not unfamiliar in Western 
traditions (it is a basic theme of Hellenistic philosophy).  But that this can be 
brought about fully only through the mental disciplines the Buddha calls right 
effort,  mindfulness,  and  concentration  –  what  is  usually  referred  to  as 
meditation in the West – is not so familiar.
 115 
   
Furthermore: 
Buddhist  meditation  has  no  significant  correlate  in  Western  epistemological 
discussions. It is not a product of subjective feelings or desires, it does not aim 
at a non-cognitive, dream-like condition.
116 
 
Buddhist meditation is said by its most experienced Buddhist practitioners to provide 
us with an objective knowledge of reality, prajna or insight. Whilst prajna includes 
intellectual  knowledge,  it  is  not  objective  knowledge  in  the  sense  that  Western 
philosophy conceives of science, for example. Insight is a mystical kind of knowledge 
that enables us to overcome suffering, in which, for the Buddha, reason has a limited 
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place, only able to take us so far in the search for full enlightenment. Gowans reminds 
us that the knowledge meditation gives is not based on a rational grasp of self-evident 
truths; it is not the result of logical inferences; and it is not grounded in the ordinary 
experiences of the five senses; it is a very different approach to and outcome from the 
rational  reflection  of  Aristotle’s  contemplative  man  on  the  nature  of  the  cosmos. 
Prajna or wisdom may draw on the same epistemological sources but its meditation 
cannot be reduced or understood in terms of any of them individually.
117 As already 
mentioned its truths are not such as can be conceived of in propositional terms; indeed 
in the final analysis they are simply inexpressible.  
The Buddha not only encouraged his questioners not to be confined by the limits of 
reason and logic, he also discouraged them from losing themselves in speculation. 
Though he was their model, he exhorted them not to accept doctrines on his authority; 
they were to follow the Noble Eightfold Path and discover the truths of his teaching 
for themselves. Instead of his followers considering only whether a doctrine is worthy 
of belief in view of its truth-aptness, he wished to emphasise to them the importance 
of always considering any belief from experience within a practice.  The latter, he felt, 
would do more to show them that the doctrine was worthy of belief, insofar as it 
helped sustain them in believing, for example,  that there is no self-existent reality.   
Two kinds of meditation are to be practised in conjunction with mindfulness in its 
usual  sense:  serenity  meditation  (samatha-bhavana)  and  insight  meditation 
(vipassana-bhavana). The aim of serenity meditation is to purify the mind of various 
obstacles so that, subsequently, it may reach the highest degree of concentration.  The 
Buddha thought our minds were typically in so much turmoil that, without radical 
modification, they had no chance of truly understanding reality.  Serenity meditation 
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involves  extensive  training  in  focusing  our  attention  wholly  and  exclusively  on  a 
single object so as to end this turmoil and gain the ability to concentrate.  
In comparison to the serene ‘knowledge with form,’ reached in the final stage of 
concentration  meditation,  the  more  advanced  insight  meditation  that  follows  on  it 
reaches what is called ‘formless knowledge’ in its final stage. Such knowledge is 
perhaps best described as mystical.
 118  
It is the latter kind of meditation which gives a foundation for attaining the highest 
kind of understanding or wisdom.  Here, the purpose for the Buddhist is to directly 
know reality as it truly is.  Insight meditation is a matter of heightened and attentive 
awareness  rather  than  intellectual  or  theoretical  thought.  It  involves  detailed  and 
mindful  observations  of  all  aspects  of  one’s  person  through  which  one  comes  to 
realize the impermanence of things, the suffering associated with this, the absence of 
any self, and ultimately the Four Noble Truths.  Gowans attempts to describe the 
indescribable experience one is said to attain by insight meditation as follows: 
The  eventual  outcome  is  the  realization  of  Nibbana,  an  immediate 
comprehension of the unconditioned realm beyond the ordinary world of sense 
experience, an understanding that cannot be adequately described in language, 
but that liberates us from attachment and enables us to live with compassion, 
joy, and tranquillity.
119 
 
The  Buddha’s  aim  in  his  ethics  is  to  purify  mind  and  heart  in  the  radical 
transformation that the Buddha thought was required to attain Nirvana. For him our 
unenlightened  nature  is  deeply  flawed,  and  only  extraordinary  measures  can 
overcome  this:  Mahayana  Buddhism,  in  its  teachings  on  compassion  and  its 
meditative  disciplines  in  particular,  exemplifies  such  measures.    Especially  for 
Western  minds,  however,  two  important  questions  remain.  The  karma/rebirth 
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doctrines  are  problematic,  compared  to  a  Western  philosophical  understanding  of 
notions of individual responsibility and culpability.  Similarly, the ‘no-self’ doctrine 
poses the question as to just who is the agent of moral acts, if not an independent, 
self-existent entity?  If the Buddhist answer is a process-self, does this not imply a 
self as a subject of action and experience? 
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Chapter Three 
A comparison of Aristotelian and Buddhist ethics: the differences  
Before embarking on the present chapter, let's just remind ourselves where this piece 
of  work  is  going  –  what  is  its  intended  aim?  With  the  ground-breaking  work  in 
Buddhist studies in the past twenty years there has been a slow but steady show of 
interest in comparing Buddhist and Aristotelian ethics by several scholars, especially 
in North America and Britain.  My aim in the next two chapters is to use their work to 
examine the conceptual differences and similarities between the philosophical and 
ethical frameworks of Aristotle and the Buddha.  These will provide the basis for the 
practices that  I will draw together in the final chapter that might be employed to 
postulate a “moral way” for young people in an increasingly secular society. 
There are two reasons for setting out the dissimilarities in this chapter: the differences 
between Buddhist and Aristotelian ethics have made the greatest impact on me; and 
subtly examining the nuanced similarities is a more difficult job, so that task is set 
aside for Chapter Four.   
Whilst  both  the  Buddha  and  Aristotle  have  in  mind  the  need  to  provide  their 
‘disciples’ with a way to reach perfection, each of them differs in what he holds as 
constitutive  of  that  perfection.    Aristotle’s  main  aim  in  his  ethics  of  virtue  is  to 
provide guidelines for attaining eudaimonia or the happiness or fulfilment to which 
only  “a  life  of  activity  in  accordance  with  virtue”  gives  rise.  Habituation  and 
education in the virtues are seen as the necessary groundwork, already mentioned in 
Chapter One, if one is to develop one’s potential (over a lifetime) and provided the set 
of conditions for the arête is met.  These conditions depend on more than merely the 
dispositions  to  act  virtuously.  Underlying  factors,  such  as  a  certain  measure  of 
material  prosperity,  good  health,  and  natural  endowment,  are  also  referred  to  by   60 
Aristotle as necessary for such aretaic growth. Moreover, achieving such a state is 
understood as applying within one’s natural term of life; Aristotle thinks that well-
being can be attained in the course of one’s life and is complete upon death; there is 
no personal immortality of the soul. This resonates with Heidegger’s “Being unto 
death” – fulfilment is possible in life but not fully attained until one enters ‘the last 
horizon.’
120 
In contrast, the main aim of the Buddha is soteriological; he wishes to provide his 
followers with a path to salvation which, for him, is to be found in ‘final,’ that is, 
post-death nirvana or liberation, the moment when one becomes fully enlightened, 
enters a state of ‘ultimate reality,’ and is freed from the suffering of karmic rebirth. In 
the attainment of what Schmidt-Leukel terms this ‘transcendent’ end,
121 it can be seen 
that the Buddha’s aim in his ethics is more radical than that of Aristotle; it is to root 
out the ‘defilements’ and transform the ego, by re-aligning it through the realization 
of selflessness and the meditative disciplines.  
Whilst neither the Buddha’s aim of nirvana, nor Aristotle’s aim of eudaimonia is 
compatible with a morality founded on ethical egoism (of which more in Chapter 
Four), there is a definite distinction between the two in the thrust of their ethics. This 
is  derived  from  their  differing  metaphysical  notions  of  ipseity  and  alterity;  the 
Aristotelian distinction of self and other contrasts with the Buddhist identity of self 
and oneness.  
In  the  case  of  Aristotle,  the  flourishing  of  an  individual  depends  on  her  virtuous 
actions being done for the sake of the other, that is, the polis or community. In its 
turn, the state acts morally on behalf of its citizens by providing conditions within 
which they may flourish. The focus is societal and anthropocentric, the self is dual, 
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body and mind, and inter-subjective relations are conceptualised as being between 
separate, substantial, individual entities. Thus, one of the most significant features of 
Aristotelian flourishing is that it is a dual, interdependent process between self and 
others.  
Shaun Gallagher claims that practical wisdom, even if it is about the self, involves an 
implicit self-relation that is both embodied and endogenously inter-subjective: 
The notion that the self is endogenously inter-subjective means that it is not just 
constrained or conditioned from the outside by its social environment, but is 
social from the inside out.  And only by being inter-subjective from the inside 
out, in a primary way, is it possible for it to be significantly social from the 
outside in, and subject to the constraints and conditions of social life.
122  
 
         Gallagher quotes Aristotle in support of the preceding contemporary notion of the 
moral self: “For what we are enabled to do by our friends, we ourselves, in a sense, 
are able to do.”
 123 
 
When speaking of a Buddhist practitioner, on the other hand, whether of an Eastern 
monastic  or  a  Western  lay  individual,  he/she  is  drawn,  initially,  to  obeying  the 
precepts and acquiring meditative cultivation for the sake of his/her own purification 
and to earn ‘good’ karma. It is worth noting that there is both an ordinary and a Noble 
Eightfold Path and that a lay practitioner in a Buddhist culture is most likely to remain 
at the ‘ordinary’ level, hoping only to gain enough ‘merit’ to have a more favourable 
rebirth.
124 The ordinary Path is perfected only in those who are approaching the lead 
up to what is designated as ‘stream-entry’.
125 At the latter point a person gains what 
Harvey describes as ‘a first glimpse of nirvana’ and the ‘stream’ leading there, and is 
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thereby encouraged to enter upon the Noble Eightfold Path.
126  To achieve what the 
Buddha believed was required to attain salvation, a more radical transformation is 
necessary than that demanded by training and education in the case of her Aristotelian 
counterpart, notwithstanding the high degree of discipline these entail. With gradual 
progress  on  the  Eightfold  Path  –  rooting  out  the  ‘defilements’  by  her  rigorous 
cultivation of meditation and obedience to the precepts – she acquires compassion for 
all sentient beings, through experiencing her lack of a sense of a separate, independent 
self  and  a  corresponding  growth  in  awareness  of  the  inseparable  nature  of  inter-
subjective relations; self cannot exist without other, nor other without self. Compared 
to Aristotle, the Buddha’s view of self and other is non-dualist; his monist concept of 
the inseparability of all sentient beings is the ground of his bio-centric, as opposed to 
anthropocentric, ethics. The permeability of Buddhist boundaries provides the greatest 
contrast  with  Aristotle’s  socio-anthropocentric  ethics.  In  the  latter,  whilst  the 
individual and community are thought of as inter-subjectively involved, self and other 
remain, ultimately, separate entities.  
The third and, in practical terms the most telling, difference between the aims of the 
Buddha and Aristotle, is the means by which each is to be attained.  For Aristotle the aim 
of acquiring a morally ordered, dynamic engagement with the world is achieved by means 
of one’s reason.  It is the agent’s reason which forms and informs both the moral virtues, 
which  equip  us  for  successful  social  relations  within  a  civilized  society,  and  the 
intellectual  virtues,  which  enable  our  successful  engagement  in  rational  enterprises. 
Aristotle compares the virtues to skills acquired through practice and habituation.  They 
are dispositions, arising from settled states of character, acquired largely by a process of 
practical and reflective training. Aristotle sets the greatest store by the initial stage of this 
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process – what he calls the ‘moral habituation’ of a child by its parents from the earliest 
years.    The  overriding  importance  of  such  work,  pointed  out  in  Chapter  One,  bears 
repeating: 
It makes no small difference…. whether we form habits of one kind or another from 
our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference.
127 
 
When his students come to him for further education, he fully expects their comportment 
to show that they have already acquired a solid grounding in the moral virtues. And, even 
though the intellectual virtues will be the new addition at this stage of their education,  
Aristotle sees part of their task as continuing to develop their moral virtues. His students 
will  acquire  phronesis  not  just  by  ‘hanging  about  with  the  right  people’  (Gallagher’s 
paraphrase), that is, virtuous tutors – parents, teachers, caregivers – important though 
these are. They must continue learning to act in the right way to equip them to take up 
their place in the polis.
128 
The  Buddha,  on  the  other  hand,  emphasises  the  acquiring  of  compassion  mainly 
through  the  realization  of  selflessness  and  the  meditative  disciplines.  Moreover, 
unlike Aristotle, two levels pertain here, as in several aspects of Buddhist teaching: 
for  lay-people  in  Eastern  cultures,  such  training,  when  it  takes  place,  is  usually 
concentrated in their old age; for Buddhist monks and nuns, and for Western Buddhist 
adherents, training is ongoing from earliest days. Thurman (1994) underlines what has 
been mentioned earlier concerning Buddhist thought – delusion is the root cause of 
suffering, and wisdom is the antidote for delusion, hence the root cause of liberation.  
Prajna or wisdom is not accumulated instrumental knowledge, but is a special kind of 
super-knowing,  a  knowing  by  becoming  the  known,  by  transcending  the  subject-
object dichotomy. Thus, liberation is achieved not by believing, not by participating 
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in  any  ceremony  or  belonging  to  any  group,  but  by  understanding  in  the  deepest 
possible way. The cultivation of such understanding naturally became the task of the 
Buddha's teaching, and the mission of the Buddhist tradition.
129 Meditation was an 
indispensable discipline for deepening and empowering this understanding. But its 
practice  has  applied  more  to  the  monastic  traditions  of  Buddhism  until  fairly 
recently.
130  
There  have,  of  course,  been  many  variant  forms  of  a  Buddhist  tradition.  Zen 
Buddhism, which arose in Japanese culture, has also made a significant impact in the 
Western world, particularly in North America.   However, Mahayana Buddhist ethics 
has been selected here as the exemplar, with which to compare Aristotelian ethics, 
since  it  arguably  has  a  metaphysics,  which,  though  complex,  provides  a  highly 
developed foundations for its ethics.  As already mentioned, generally the Buddhist 
ideal is predicated on living many lives on the model of the Buddha  until ‘final’ 
nirvana. This is different in the case of Mahayana Buddhism, where the Buddhist 
ideal is modelled on that of the Bohdisattva, a being who, after many lives also, is 
destined for enlightenment. However, out of compassion for other sentient beings, he 
or she vows to refrain from entering post-death nirvana until every being is saved. By 
contrast, the Aristotelian ideal of the phronimos or man
131 of practical reason, whilst 
also  based on the development of potential of an independent individual – from me-
as-I-am  to  the  fulfilled  me-as-I-could-be  –  is  contained  within  the  course  of  an 
individual’s  life.  Death  is  final,  marking  the  apotheosis  of  one’s  eudaimona  or 
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fulfilment.  The major difference in practice between Aristotelian and Buddhist ethics 
lies in what each considers of central importance in morality; simply put, Aristotle 
accords the prime role to reason, whereas, for the Buddha, it is compassion which has 
the main claim. Aristotle starts from what most of us would pre-philosophically have 
taken to be true and displays a concern for the truth, even though it can be argued that 
truth in ethics cannot be formulated exactly. Aristotle’s ethics centres on the ordinary, 
everyday  experiences  that  people  have  of  trying  to  live  a  good  life.  For  him  the 
interplay  between  emotional  sensitivity,  rational  coherence  and  philosophical 
infrastructure are the main themes of his kind of virtue ethics.
132  Aristotle expects his 
students, having been well brought up, to arrive with the ground already prepared for 
further  training  in  ethics.  They  will  be  further  educated  in  his  ethics  course, 
principally,  though  not  exclusively,  in  the  intellectual  virtues,  to  prepare  them  to 
engage in lives of virtuous activity in the city-state.  For Aristotle, one’s agency and 
reason shape one’s world.  
He accords reason the pivotal role of controlling desire and emotions in the training 
and  formation  of  the  phronimos.  Only  the  virtuous  person  has  the  practical 
intelligence or wisdom necessary for exercising responsible moral choice.  Moreover, 
as Aristotle points out, it is not the character of the actions that make them virtuous, 
but the character of the agent: 
The agent must also be in a certain condition when he does them: in the first 
place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose 
them for their own sakes, and thirdly his actions must proceed from a firm and 
unchangeable character.
133  
 
Gallagher, whose notion of the endogenously inter-subjective nature of the self has 
been  mentioned  earlier,  elaborates  on  phronesis  as  the  practical,  as  distinct  from 
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theoretical  or  propositional,  self-knowledge  that  we  gain  as  we  live  through  our 
situated and embodied actions: 
Phronesis involves a practical knowledge about oneself from the inside out, and 
from within the practical situation in which one exists.  
 
Concomitant with this Gallagher does not view this self as isolated in its practical 
reason: 
Although  this  is  a  know-how  gained  from  the  inside  out,  it  is  not  a  purely 
subjective knowledge, since from the inside (endogenously), and from birth, we 
are  inter-subjectively  involved  with  others,  and  our  self  is  shaped  by  these 
encounters.
 134 
 
In contrast, Mahayana Buddhism draws on what Western philosophy understands by 
moral intuitionism, that is, we rely on our moral instincts to point us to good action 
and  away  from  bad.  Moreover,  this  form  of  Buddhism  appeals  to  observing  the 
precepts  and  fostering  compassion.  Reason  is  present  but  considered  as  only  one 
aspect of morality.  Virtue, for the Buddhist, is more the effect of ridding oneself of 
the three ‘defilements’ – craving, hatred and delusion – through an interdependent 
practice of mindfulness, meditation, and morality, which together will lead to a lack 
of a sense of a separate self. Harvey outlines the importance of the no-self doctrine for 
a Buddhist:  
It supports ethics by undermining the source of lack of respect, selfishness. This 
is done by undercutting the notion that ‘I’ am a substantial, self-identical entity, 
one that should be gratified and be able to override others if they get in ‘my’ 
way.    It  means  that  ‘your’  suffering  and  ‘my’  suffering  are  not  inherently 
different. They are just suffering, so the barrier which generally keeps us within 
our  own  ‘self-interest’  should  be  dissolved,  or  widened  in  its  scope  till  it 
includes all beings.
 135 
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This is a metaphysical world-view that presumes the collapse of subject and object 
into one/self as sole determiner of thought and experience.  To shape one’s world as a 
Buddhist, one has only to think of oneself as one with the universe, that one is a 
karmic force through one’s breathing and one’s action.  
Of course, a belief as simple sounding in theory is far from being simple in practice.  
Ambivalent positions regarding the status of women, for example may be used to 
illustrate  just  how  difficult  achieving  oneness  with  the  universe  is.  The  Buddha’s 
enlightenment and teaching with respect to oneness with all sentient beings led early 
Buddhism  to  stress  the  basic  equality  of  all  humans  and  denounce  opposing 
tendencies in Brahmanism.
136   However, the history of Buddhist attitudes to women 
has  varied  across  time  and  depends  largely  on  the  different  cultures  by  which 
Buddhism  has  been  embraced:  at  one  time  and  in  one  culture  there  has  been  a 
acceptance of the equality of status between men and women as part of his insight: at 
another time, or in another place, the possibility of a woman attaining ‘Buddhahood’ 
has been claimed to be conditional on her re-birth as a man (usually after seven re-
births). Beginning with Diana Paul’s ground-breaking ‘Women in Buddhism’ (1979), 
the ensuing feminist discussion has examined the reasons for the discrepancy between 
basic  Buddhist  insights  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  traditional  restriction  of 
‘Buddhahood’ to the male gender (as well as all the other forms of gender-inequality) 
on the other.  Schmidt-Leukel summarises:   
The  male  perspective  is  dominant  because  men  dominated  the  institutional 
structures  of  Buddhism.    Buddhist  feminists,  like  their  counterparts  in  other 
religious traditions, are therefore not only working towards an equal access of 
women to a game in which men set the rules, but towards a change of the rules 
themselves.
137  
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While the results from successful negotiation of the ‘Middle Way’ of the Buddha, or of 
the ‘Doctrine of the Mean’ of Aristotle, might appear similar, they conceal some radical 
differences.  As we have already seen, Aristotle places great importance on our nature as 
rational beings. This determines our ultimate well-being and the virtues that contribute to 
it. For Aristotle the basic model is the regulation of desires  and emotions by reason. 
Appropriate responses are the ones that are in accord with the judgement of a particular 
type of person – the person of practical wisdom. Moreover, virtues are to be defined in 
terms of a judgement. His claim implies that for an emotional response to be virtuous it 
must be in accord with what reason judges to be the true demands of the situation, since 
reason aims at truth.  Emotions, then, are not simply to be accepted as given. They are 
subject  to  rational  assessment  and  ideally  to  rational  control.  The  standard  by  which 
virtuous and vicious dispositions are distinguished from one another is a rational standard. 
The important point in every case is to discern and, if possible, name the patterns of 
emotional  over-  and  under-reaction  and  to  be  ready  should  they  arise  again.    For 
Aristotle’s  man  of  practical  reason,  deliberative,  emotional,  and  social  skills  are  all 
necessary and interweave with each other. 
For the Buddha, desires and emotions are also regulated but not in the same way as 
those of Aristotle’s man of practical reason. Since he was more deeply pessimistic 
about human nature, he believed that desires and emotions needed to be reshaped 
rigorously from the perspective of the realization of selflessness. This depends more 
on the meditative disciplines than on rational inquiry as a purifying preparation for a 
non-dualist experience that expresses itself above all in compassion and unlimited 
loving-kindness.  It is said to remove the film of ignorance that clouds insight into 
one’s own true nature and that of reality. Although Aristotle’s exemplar of the first   69 
kind of ideal life in the ideally circumstanced situation, his intellectual contemplative, 
is  also  disciplined,  the  object  of  his  reflection  is  quite  different  from  that  of  his 
Buddhist  counterpart.  Moreover,  as  already  argued  in  Chapter  One,  the  state  of 
eudaimonia  is  more  regularly  attained  and  understood  in  the  second  exemplar  of 
Aristotelian ideal life, in the however-circumstanced situation of Aristotle’s man of 
practical wisdom. In either case, Aristotle’s more optimistic belief in human nature’s 
innate capacity for rational inquiry, plus a metaphysical framework that depends on 
the  interdependent  and  inter-subjective  nature  of  a  flourishing  individual  and 
community, are the two features that most distinguish his man of virtue from that of 
the Buddha.
138  
In Chapter Two reference was made to the Buddhist claim that there are three main 
elements in any spiritual progress: sila (morality), prajna (insight or wisdom) and 
samadhi (meditative cultivation).  Basic to the core element of samadhi for B. Alan 
Wallace are two central practices: the Buddha’s ‘Four Foundations of Mindfulness;’ 
and a matrix of contemplations: ‘Dwelling on the Four Divine Abidings’ or ‘The Four 
Immeasurables’ (I will use find the latter term here since it captures more closely the 
cosmic extent of the meditations).  Mindfulness was already discussed in Chapter 
Two. I will discuss here the first two meditations on the affective states of loving-
kindness  and  compassion;  they  are  key  to  ‘The  Four  Immeasurables’  and  the 
remaining two, empathetic joy and equanimity, depend on them, if they are to be  
effective.
139  
Wallace examines the first state, metta or loving-kindness, which he understands as 
“the heartfelt yearning for the well-being of others.”  He explains that the English 
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term ‘love’, although an equivalent of the Pali, is usually avoided in referring to metta 
since in English ‘love’ is often used in ways that conflate an ‘I-you’ relationship with 
an  ‘I-it’  relationship.  The  loving-kindness  cultivated  in  Buddhist  practice 
emphatically entails an ‘I-you’ relationship; one learns to be vividly aware of the 
other person’s joys and sorrows, hopes and fears. But in English the word ‘love’ is 
also used in cases of sexual infatuation, possessive personal attachment, and even 
strong  attraction  to  inanimate  objects  and  events,  all  of  which  involve  ‘I-it’ 
relationships.
140    
Traditionally in each of the four meditations one applies each of the states to oneself, 
in the first place; then one extends it outwards through a range of people, from known 
to  unknown,  best-liked  to  least-liked.  In  cultivating  metta,  for  example,  one  first 
contemplates bestowing loving-kindness on oneself, then one proceeds to extend it. 
Wallace points out the apparent paradox of such a movement and explains that its 
rationale derives from a premise of the Buddha: ‘Whoever loves himself will never 
harm another.’
141  
One begins the meditative practice, therefore, by attending to one’s own longing for 
happiness and wish to be free of suffering, and one generates the loving wish: ‘May I 
be  free  of  animosity,  affliction  and  anxiety,  and  live  happily;’  it  is  as  if  one  has 
entered into an ‘I-you’ relationship with oneself.
142   In the next phase one evokes in 
one’s mind someone else whom one loves and respects, wishing for that individual 
the same as one has wished for oneself. One continues the sequence by evoking in 
one’s  mind  a  dearly  loved  friend,  then  a  person  towards  whom  one  has  been 
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indifferent, that is, an individual seen solely in terms of function (the ticket-collector, 
for example?), and finally a person for whom one has felt dislike. The aim of the 
practice is to gradually experience the same degree of loving kindness for the dear 
friend as for oneself, for the neutral person as for the dear friend, and finally for the 
person to whom one feels hostile as for the neutral person: 
In this way the artificial ‘I-it’ barriers demarcating friend, stranger and foe are 
broken  down,  and  immeasurable,  unconditional  loving-kindness  may  be 
experienced.
143 
 
Attachment,  in  the  Buddhist  negative  sense  of  obsessive  or  clinging  love,  is 
frequently  mistaken  for  loving-kindness;  for  this  reason  the  Buddhist  calls  it  the 
‘close  enemy’  or  counterfeit  of  loving-kindness.    According  to  Buddhism,  the 
opposite of metta is not indifference, but hatred, which is described as the ‘distant 
enemy’  of  loving-kindness.  One  succeeds  in  the  loving-kindness  practice  when  it 
causes animosity to subside, and one fails when the practice leads only to selfish 
affection, or attachment, for this implies that one is still in an ‘I-it’ relationship. 
Karuna or compassion is the second of the four ‘Immeasurables’ and is inextricably 
connected to loving-kindness.  With loving-kindness one longs that others may find 
genuine happiness and the causes of happiness, and with compassion one longs that 
others may be free of suffering and its causes; they are two sides of the same coin. 
Wallace  draws  a  parallel:  just  as  attachment  is  frequently  mistaken  for  loving-
kindness, so righteous indignation for others can be confused with compassion. If 
one’s compassion extends only to the victims and not to their persecutors, one risks 
attachment to the victims and hatred of the perpetrators of misery/violence; one is still 
trapped in an ‘I-it’ mentality. Wallace explains: 
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According  to  Buddhism,  all  the  evil  perpetrated  in  the  world  stems  from 
attachment, aversion, and the ignorance and delusion that underlie both.  These 
destructive  tendencies  are  regarded  as  mental  afflictions,  very  much  like 
physical  afflictions,  and  those  who  are  dominated  by  them  are  even  more 
deserving of compassion than those afflicted with physical diseases.
 144  
 
As in the practice for the loving-kindness meditation, one follows a similar sequence 
in cultivating compassion.  One attends first to someone who is downtrodden and 
miserable, wishing, ‘If only this person could be freed from such suffering!’ One then 
focuses on an evil-doer (without regard to whether the individual seems happy at 
present), on a dear person, a neutral person, and finally on someone for whom one has 
felt hostility.  The goal is as before, namely, to break down the barriers separating 
these different types of individuals until one’s compassion extends to all beings.  
Wallace  pinpoints  the  “counterfeit”  of  compassion  as  grief.    When  one  attends 
empathetically to another person who is unhappy, one’s own sadness may give rise to 
righteous indignation and the wish to exact revenge, on behalf of the victim, on the 
one who has made the other person unhappy.  However, empathetic sadness, properly 
understood, is a catalyst for compassion in Buddhist terms, causing one to move from 
the reality of the present suffering to wishing the other the possibility of freedom from 
that suffering.
 145 
The opposite of compassion is not indifference for the Buddhist, which is a passive 
and neutral stance.  Its opposite is cruelty, whereby, despite one’s acknowledgment of 
the inter-subjective nature of self and other, one wishes consciously, and irrationally,  
that the individual in question may experience misery/violence.  Wallace reminds us: 
It is important to emphasise that the Buddhist meditative cultivation of loving-
kindness and compassion was never intended as a substitute for active service to 
others. Rather, it is a mental preparation for such altruistic service that raises 
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the likelihood of such outer behaviour being truly an expression of an inner, 
benevolent concern for others’ well-being.
146  
 
A Buddhist practitioner is responding to the four ‘Immeasurables’ as a person of faith 
within a living tradition rather than as an exponent of a hard-edged system of belief.  
It is in the former light that the testimony of many Buddhists is to be understood when 
they  describe the format and prescriptions  for  meditating on the  four  wholesome, 
affective states as a most effective means of re-establishing  harmony and balance 
within whichever state one is currently contemplating. As when Buddhist forms of 
mindfulness meditation (both serenity and insight forms) are properly understood and 
practised,  similarly  meditation  on  the  four    ‘Immeasurables’  is  rather  a  form  of 
discipline than a technique aimed at achieving peak experiences.  That the latter aim 
is  frequently  mistaken  as  the  true  purpose  of  any  meditation  is  a  measure  of  the 
strength  of  ego-attachment.  Despite  the  unfamiliarity  of  this  approach  to  non-
Buddhists, they may find it raises an essential question – where can one realistically 
begin to change the world except in oneself?  The latter finds a parallel in Aristotle’s 
conviction that a person learns to become responsible for her actions from earliest 
childhood.  We might say, then, that both the Buddha and Aristotle echo Gandhi’s 
dictum: “Be the change you want to see in the world,” and this similarity will be 
developed more appropriately in chapter Five.  
Gowans brings the difference in aim between the two sets of ethics into sharpest focus 
in his comparison of the moderation conveyed by Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean 
and the radical transformation the Buddha thought was required to attain nirvana:  
For  the  Buddha  our  unenlightened  nature  is  deeply  flawed,  and  only 
extraordinary  measures  can  overcome  this.  Aristotle’s  conception  of  human 
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nature is quite different: the virtues develop our nature, but they do not radically 
transform it……
147  
 
 
Aristotle  attaches  the  predominant  weight  to  reason,  and  the  Buddha  to  insight. 
Conversely, whereas the Buddha attaches most importance to meditative cultivation, 
in both versions of the Aristotelian ideal life, that of the man of contemplation, as well 
as that of the man of practical wisdom, Aristotle stresses rational inquiry.  
How  are  we  to  evaluate  the  differences  in  this  comparison  of  Aristotelian  and 
Buddhist ethics? It has been emphasised several times in this chapter that Aristotle’s 
ethics is grounded on an interdependent and inter-subjective connection between the 
flourishing of individuals and their society. Wallace points out that Western thought is 
mainly  anthropocentric  with  regard  to  inter-subjective  relationships.
148  One  might 
argue that Aristotle’s social ethic is a prime example of this.  It has already been 
mentioned that, if an individual is to flourish, her virtuous activity has always to be 
for the sake of the other, that is, the community (and vice-versa).  On the other hand, 
Buddhism, as already mentioned, is bio-centric; its aim is to cultivate loving-kindness 
and  the  other  three  ‘wholesome’  or  virtuous  affective  states  towards  all  sentient 
beings.   
More may be gained by seeking the perfection of Buddhist ethics, compassion for all 
sentient beings, at the present time, given our many, varied concerns about climate 
change,  terrorism,  third  world  poverty,  and  so  on.    At  the  same  time,  rational 
reflection  and  action,  which  are  central  to  Aristotle’s  approach  to  ethics,  make  a 
complementary  claim  as  indispensable  to  any  worthwhile  account  of  ethics  and 
ethical behaviour. These themes will be developed and substantiated in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter Four 
A comparison of Aristotelian and Buddhist ethics:  the similarities  
Christopher  W.  Gowans,  in  Philosophy  of  the  Buddha  [2003],  welcomes  a 
comparison of Buddhist and – among others – Aristotelian ethics when he says:   
Lines  of  communication  are  available  by  which  a  Western  philosophical 
perspective might constructively encounter the teaching of the Buddha.
149   
 
In The Nature of Buddhist Ethics
150 Damien Keown had already set up the kind of 
comparison  of  Buddhist  and  Aristotelian  ethics  that  Gowans  thinks  is  useful.  My 
previous  chapter  signalled  that  the  two  sets  of  ethics  represent  very  different 
approaches  to  the  basic  moral  question  of  how  we  should  lead  our  lives.  Keown 
provides  another  perspective:  Aristotle  and  the  Buddha  reached  very  similar 
conclusions as to how we should conduct our lives, if we wish to find happiness and 
fulfilment as human beings. In the section that follows, I will develop his analysis of 
the two approaches and advance some observations of my own on his comparison.  
Notwithstanding the differences between Buddhist and Aristotelian ethics noted in  
Chapter Three, and in particular between the metaphysics of the Aristotelian subject 
and the Buddhist no-self, there are many similarities to be found between the two sets 
of ethics.  The first of these is in terms of moral choice or judgement.  The Buddhist 
term for moral choice,  cetana, covers such a  wide psychological  continuum from 
intention and volition to stimulus, motive, and drive, that it is not likely that any 
single term in English will convey its full range of meanings.
151 The Encyclopaedia of 
Buddhism describes it as follows: 
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151 The problem with translation is a familiar one. Cf., earlier discussion of the range of English terms 
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Cetana or the will which is conditioned by affective and cognitive elements 
(vedana, sanna) may either function as the closely directed effort on the part of 
the individual or it may function, as it often does, without conscious deliberation 
by him.
152   
 
Keown  extends  this  definition,  suggesting  that  it  may  well  stand  for  Aristotelian 
phronesis or practical reason: 
[When] cetana is understood in an expanded goal-seeking sense, that is, when it 
is considered in terms of motivation, it will be directed towards some end or 
other.  It would then not be just the specific faculty of choice which comes at 
the end of deliberation, but also be present from the start as the faculty which 
originally intuits the good ends in connection with which practical choices will 
subsequently need to be made.
153  
 
So, there is a dual emphasis on both affective and cognitive aspects of effort or will 
and conscious and unconscious deliberation or choice, but these pairs are not separate 
in action for the Buddhist.   
Prohairesis, Aristotle’s moral judgement, likewise involves the cooperation – even 
the interplay – of reason and desire. Aristotle says that prohairesis is ‘either desireful 
reason or reasonable desire’ (NE VI.2, 1139b4-5). In speaking of prohairesis Keown 
uses the term ‘faculties;’ in speaking of cetana he refers to ‘elements.’  He explains 
his use of different terms as reflecting the  greater ontological  commitment of the 
Aristotelian notion of a permanent self, as distinct from the  Buddhist notion of a 
process-self.
154    The  most  significant  aspect  of  his  comparison  for  Keown  is  the 
common ground they share.  He notes that moral responsibility and moral choice are 
both determined by the total personality with its cognitive and affective faculties:  
Cetana and prohairesis are defined with reference to that core of the personality 
which is the final resort of explanation for moral action and which is ultimately 
definitive of moral status.
155  
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To which aspect of the core person do we appeal, if we wish to explain moral action 
and ascribe moral status?  As discussed previously in Chapter One, Aristotelian ethics 
appeals primarily to desire in its pre-reflective state, then – through an appeal to the 
good – pre-reflective desire is tempered by reflective reason.  The involvement of 
reason in this process does not mean that moral choice is calculative at base: virtue is 
manifest most clearly in one who chooses promptly and intuitively what is right:  
In such a person the desire for the good is instinctive and the choice of right 
means can be made immediately without the distorting influence of egoistical 
considerations.
156 
 
Keown draws a parallel between Aristotelian and Buddhist desire for the good: 
In Buddhism virtuous choices are rational choices motivated by a desire for 
what is good and deriving their validation ultimately from the final good for 
man (nirvana).
157  
 
It may strike some Buddhist scholars as strange to speak approvingly of ‘desire,’ but 
Keown hopes to disprove an all too common view that the Buddhist stance is to seek 
an end to all desire. Keown points out that, in a Buddhist context, such an assumption 
regarding the total elimination of all desire:  
[This] would be a suppression of the affective side of human nature and result 
only in apathy…….  What Buddhism seeks an end of is desire for what is not 
good, namely things which cripple rather than promote spiritual growth.
158 
  
Buddhism aims not to eradicate all feeling but to liberate it from its attachment to 
false values.  The goal, as with an Aristotelian “life of activity in accordance with 
virtue,” is to replace worthless objectives by an orientation of the entire personality 
towards  the  good.    Keown  points  to  the  way  in  which  the  Buddha’s  own  life 
witnessed to the truth of this:  
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Even the Buddha was not free of desires, although he was, of course, free from 
desire motivated by delusion (selfish desire).  His desire for the well-being of 
others became his characteristic feature throughout his life before nirvana, and 
remained thereafter. He tells us that as far as others are concerned ‘he desires 
their good, welfare and salvation.’
159  
 
To attain enlightenment and pass from being Gautama to Buddha, he had to have lost 
all  attachment  to  false  thinking  and  false  desires,  that  is,  become  ego-less. 
‘Thereafter’ in the text refers to his continuing to live a moral, compassionate life 
after  enlightenment.  Enlightenment  itself  must  be  desired  as  the  most  worthwhile 
goal, and in the later Buddhist Canon King Ananda rejects the suggestion that desire 
for nirvana is a hindrance to its attainment.
160 The need to dispel the mistaken notion 
that for the Buddhist desire is necessarily bad, was clarified in Chapter Two.  There it 
was  suggested  that  a  better  understanding  in  the  West  of  the  different  shades  of 
meaning of the Buddhist terms for desire is indispensable if, for example, one is to be 
able to distinguish chanda/‘right’ or positive desire from tanha/’wrong’ or negative 
desire. 
Keown points to a dual aspect in correcting tanha/wrong desire: through moderation 
or restraint first putting a stop to its excessive forms; and second the directing of 
desire towards that which is identified as good. It is in this second  aspect that Keown 
finds  a  parallel  between  Buddhist  disciplining  and  Aristotelian  habituation  and 
education. Buddhism needs: 
a programme of correct rational analysis.  What is required to overcome tanha is 
the partnership of reason and chanda/right desire, involving both insight into the 
unworthy  nature  of  these  objectives  and  the  simultaneous  education  of  the 
feelings to delight in only worthwhile (good) ends.
161   
 
                                                 
159 Ibid.  
160 Samyutta-Nikaya, (Scriptures), v.271ff. 
161 Op. cit. 224   79 
The work of Aristotle’s phronesis or practical wisdom is also to identify what is truly 
good (and therefore truly desirable) and to pursue it intelligently, that is, by acting in 
accordance with reason.  Keown notes that, similarly  for the Buddhist, where the 
emotional response is quite appropriate: 
[K]usala or virtue involves both a correct identification of the good and a 
participation in it, and it is from this participation that arise the feelings of 
satisfaction and delight in the good.
162   
 
It is important to underline that, like Aristotelian love of virtue for its own sake, the 
feelings  of  delight  are  not  dubious  motivators  for  the  Buddhist.    What  Keown 
underlines is tanha as an incorrect evaluation and inappropriate emotional response:   
Craving stands for the kind of desire which is never satisfied.  Its aim is the 
experience of pleasurable states, but since these are transient it can never find 
fulfilment. One simple example of tanha is like the desire of an alcoholic for 
one  drink  after  another  whereas  chanda  is  the  alcoholic’s  desire  to  give  up 
alcohol  once  and  for  all.  In  the  latter  case  the  desire  dissolves  upon  the 
attainment of the  goal,  and positive feelings of satisfaction and achievement 
accompany the attainment of the goal.
163 
 
Keown concludes that the kind of desire to be avoided is not the desire to attain good 
ends,  but  the  addictive  desire  for  sensory  gratification,  one  which  cannot  ever  be 
satisfied and yet refuses to let go of its objective.  The need to root out the latter is a 
more radical notion than the Aristotelian conception of moderation of the emotions 
but I will return to the latter comparison when considering the ‘middle way’ in this 
chapter. The common ground I wish to highlight here is that each delights in the good.   
Keown concludes that both Buddhist and the Aristotelian ethics are teleological in 
nature, in that each has an end in view, the good in each case being seen as consisting 
in some natural end for human beings.  For Aristotle it is eudaimonia or happiness as 
the conception of a good, human life, attained through the exercise of virtue.  For the 
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Buddha  it  is  nirvana  or  liberation  as  the  conception  of  freedom  from  rebirth  and  
suffering, attained through the exercise of compassion.  So, as teleological systems 
they are similar to each other in structure.  The starting point in each case is in what 
Keown describes as ‘untutored’ human nature from which one moves towards the 
final telos or goal.  Moral choice is the mechanism by which progress towards this 
goal is made.  Given that Aristotelian and Buddhist ethics are so dissimilar, especially 
in view of their differing metaphysical frameworks, the similarity concerning moral 
choice  and  judgement  is  very  important.  I  will  return  to  the  teleological  parallel 
shortly when discussing the theme of virtue in both sets of ethics. 
The Buddha and Aristotle each invite us to consider moral virtue in ways which, on 
the  face  of  it,  are  remarkably  similar.  In  the  first  sutta  or  parable,  the  Buddha 
describes the Eightfold path as a ‘middle way’ between the extremes  of pursuing 
‘sensual happiness’ and pursuing ‘self-mortification.’ This idea invites comparison 
with Aristotle’s doctrine that moral virtue is ‘a mean between two vices, one of excess 
and  one  of  deficiency’  (Nichomachean  Ethics:  1107a3).  One  apt  example  of  this 
comparison between the two may be seen with respect to temperance or moderation, 
the  Aristotelian  virtue  that  is  an  intermediate  state  (relative  to  the  individual) 
concerning the bodily pleasures of eating, drinking and having sex. The similarity 
between the Buddha and Aristotle is that, for both of them, the correct avenue to 
moderation negotiates between the  extremes of greed on the one hand, and harsh 
asceticism on the other.  The results from successful negotiation of the middle way of 
the Buddha and of the doctrine of the mean for Aristotle are similar in formal terms.    
Gowans agrees with Keown’s claim of similarity on teleological grounds but holds 
that the similarity is at the formal level only.  
   81 
Agreed that Aristotle and the Buddha both advocate that we must follow a middle 
way, are their respective paths as dissimilar as Gowans maintains?  
Keown  describes  Aristotle’s  doctrine  of  the  mean  as  essentially  an  attempt  to 
establish where an appropriate emotional response lies and in doing this he refers to 
Richard Norman who writes: 
I take the doctrine to be a thesis about the proper relation between reason and 
feeling.
164  
 
Norman  regards  the  Aristotelian  thesis  as  lying  midway  between  the  extreme 
positions typified by Plato and D.H. Lawrence: 
For Plato, reason (logos) must assert authoritative control over the other two 
parts of the soul (desire and anger). For Lawrence, on the other hand, ‘reason 
should  keep  out  of  the  way,  and  leave  room  for  the  free  and  entirely 
spontaneous expression of the feelings.’
165  
 
Aristotle adopts a middle position and Keown claims that, essentially, the Buddha 
does also. However, he qualifies this claim by admitting that the variety of Buddhist 
doctrines  permits  views  closer  to  both  extremes.
166    For  example,  in  respect  of 
Theravada  Buddhism  there  is  talk  of  eradicating  the  passions  as  if  they  had  an 
autonomous life independent of reason; and in Mahayana Buddhism, by the time of 
Santiveda, raga, lust or craving is spoken of as a virtue, paradoxically, and becomes 
almost indispensable for enlightenment.
167  Certainly, neither of these extremes would 
be acceptable to either Aristotle or the Buddha, given that each of them advocates a 
‘middle  way.’  Norman  usefully  sums  up  the  interplay,  rather  than  bifurcation  of 
emotion and reason, common to the approach of both, when he says of Aristotle: 
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I want to suggest that we can usefully see Aristotle as questioning the necessity 
of this antagonism.  For Aristotle, feelings can themselves be the embodiment of 
reason.  It is not just a matter of reason controlling and guiding the feelings.  
Rather the feelings can themselves be more or less rational.  Reason can be 
present in them.
168  
 
To say that feelings are rational means that they are appropriate to the situation. For 
Aristotle a strong emotion such as anger may be appropriate in certain circumstances, 
at which time it loses its negative connotation. In Christianity there is a similar place 
for  what  Scripture  describes  as  ‘righteous  anger.’  This  is  perhaps  more  readily 
understood to-day as ‘justified anger,’ for example, in the face either of the increasing 
debt through the conditionality placed on loans to developing countries by the World 
Bank or of the corruption of governments in Third World countries responsible for 
administration of the funds.  
 For the Buddha, however, anger is always an inappropriate emotional response. If 
protest is called for, only non-violent protest, driven by compassion, is condoned. In 
late September 2007 Buddhist monks in Myanmar pleaded with lay people to leave 
them to protest peacefully, to ensure that any confrontation with the repressive regime 
remained non-violent.
169   
It is not disputed that the Buddha’s  ‘middle way’ and Aristotle’s Doctrine of the 
Mean  conceal  significant  differences  behind  their  formal  similarity,  as  Gowans 
claims. The most revealing is shown in this remark by Aristotle: ‘People who are 
deficient in pleasures and enjoy them less than is right are not found very much. For 
that sort of insensibility is not human’ (Nichomachean Ethics: 1119a7-9). For the 
Buddha, such persons were found easily; he himself had been an extreme ascetic and 
had lived alongside many ‘samanas’ or reclusive ascetics.  But the similarity between 
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them in terms of moral (and intellectual) virtue is of central importance, despite the 
differences of emphasis and means – both hold that our human happiness depends on 
our being able to moderate our desires and emotions.  
 
This  raises  the  question  of  similarity  in  another  guise:  If  both  Aristotle  and  the 
Buddha agree that we must follow the middle way, how is the correct response to be 
interpreted?  Keown points to a crucial difference between the two with regard to how 
the correct response is established: 
For  Aristotle,  the  correct  response  (the  mean)  is  determined  by  the  man  of 
practical wisdom, the phronimos. For Buddhists the phronimos is the Buddha, 
and it is his choice which determines where virtue lies.
170 
 
The  record  of  the  Buddha’s  important  moral  choices  is  to  be  found  in  Buddhist 
sources  such  as  the  Tracts  and  the  preceptual  formulae  drawn  from  them  as  the 
tradition developed.  We find the correct role for the emotions in Buddhist ethics in 
the sentiments of love and concern, in the compassion, which inspired the Buddha to 
make the choices he did.  The themes of reason and compassion will be resumed at a 
later point.
171 
Returning now to the teleological similarity between Aristotelian and Buddhist ethics, 
Chapter Three argued that eudaimonia and nirvana constitute different final ends for 
Aristotelian and Buddhist ethics. However, the two states are similar insofar as each is 
founded on a doctrine of the perfectibility of human nature. There is considerable 
common ground between the moral perspectives of Aristotle and the Buddha: they 
both advocate a moral perfection of the person that involves moral, intellectual, and 
emotional training.   
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The most notable Western moral theory that stresses virtue is the eudaimonism of the 
ancient philosophers, especially that of Aristotle. Like Keown, Gowans agrees that 
Aristotle’s emphasis on virtue and his conviction that a life of virtue and a happy life 
are  closely  connected  provide  much  common  ground  with  the  Buddha’s  moral 
outlook.
172  In their respective moral teachings Aristotle does not ignore principles, 
nor does the Buddha ignore rules. But of central importance in each of their ethics is 
the  kind  of  character  a  person  develops.    Others  interested  in  addressing  the 
connections  between  Eastern  and  Western  philosophy,  for  example,  B.  Alan 
Wallace,
173  and  those  interested  in  the  connections  between  philosophy  and  the 
cognitive sciences, such as Terrell Ward Bynum
174 and Shaun Gallagher,
175 all agree 
with Keown and  Gowans on this point. Paul  Harvey  also supports the claim that 
Aristotelian ethics is a better broad Western analogue to Buddhist ethics than any 
other ethics, Kantian or Utilitarian, say. He pinpoints the notion as common to both 
sets of ethics that what one should do is seen as enriching and rewarding.
176   
However, Gowans points out that it is the similarity regarding the interdependence of 
virtue and fulfilment in both sets of ethics which has given rise to Aristotle and the 
Buddha each being accused of a form of ethical egoism: the emphasis is on achieving 
my happiness or overcoming my suffering, and moral virtue seems only a “fortunate 
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by-product of this endeavour.”
177 But this does not hold in either case.  The man of 
practical wisdom has considerable concern for the good of others for their own sake – 
his aim, according to Aristotle, is not to gratify selfish desires. As for the Buddhist, it 
has been mentioned that, though the initial motivation for undertaking the Eightfold 
Path  may  be  focussed  on  one’s  own  suffering,  by  the  time  one  becomes  fully 
enlightened, one is understood to have a selfless compassion for all beings.  
Each set of ethics is centrally grounded on virtue as forming a person’s character. For 
the Buddhist the first section in the threefold division of the Eightfold Path, sila (the 
three factors, right speech, right action, and right livelihood), may be translated as 
virtue as well as morality. With our eye on the centrality of virtue, it is significant that 
the  other  two  sections  include  moral  dimensions:  right  intention,  classified  under 
wisdom; right effort, classified under concentration. The interdependence of the three 
sections is illustrated by the Buddha’s comment that: ‘wisdom is purified by morality, 
and morality is purified by wisdom.’
178  His conclusion parallels the final view of 
Aristotle  that  one  cannot  be  morally  good  without  practical  wisdom,  nor  have 
practical wisdom without possessing the moral virtues.
179   
Unlike Aristotle, the Buddha’s moral teaching functions at two levels, in keeping with 
his metaphysics: it is both a means to enlightenment (in preliminary form in this-life 
nirvana),  and  a  product  of  it  (in  its  highest  manifestation  in  post-death  nirvana). 
However,  since  the  primary  aim  of  the  Buddha’s  message  is  the  achievement  of 
enlightenment  and  the  fully  enlightened  person  is  both  virtuous  and  happy,  his 
teaching centrally includes a moral teaching based on virtue. It is this latter aspect of 
Buddhist ethics which most closely parallels Aristotle’s ethics of virtue; both ethics 
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resonate with MacIntyre’s challenge to ethicists to look at persons, by addressing the 
question:  What type of people ought we to become?  Aristotelian and Buddhist ethics 
both exemplify MacIntyre’s model of a re-personalised ethics, unsurprisingly in the 
case of the former since MacIntyre drew on the Aristotelian question ‘How ought I to 
live?’  in  the  first  place.  Rather  than  our  first  asking  ‘whether  an  action  is  right,’ 
MacIntyre  urges  us  to  attend  to  ‘not  only  what  we  are  now  doing,’  but  more 
importantly to, ‘who we are now becoming.’
180  The interesting discovery for the 
author has been how big a role the latter notion plays in Buddhist ethics also.  
At the outset of The Nature of Buddhist Ethics Keown sets out the evidence that there 
has been a turning away from an earlier intellectualisation of Buddhism. This had 
fostered a devaluation of ethics, relegated it to a preliminary stage of the religious life, 
implying that we live through an initial, necessary, ethical stage, but move on to a 
stage where insight is primary and we can afford to let go of ethical concerns. In 
support of his thesis that there has been a turning away from an over-emphasis on 
prajna or insight, he cites what he calls Harvey Aronson’s “landmark study,” Love 
and Sympathy in Theravada Buddhism (1980). The latter work stressed the Buddha’s 
compassion,  rather  than  that  knowledge  which  we  associate  with  reason  and 
judgement, whether empirical, aesthetic or ethical.
181  Keown’s own work develops 
Aronson’s  thesis  by  suggesting  that  characterisation  of  Buddhist  ethics  can  be 
resolved  most  successfully  when  more  basic  questions  concerning  their  overall 
structure  and  role  in  relationship  to  Buddhist  soteriology  have  been  explored.
182 
Though Keown has elected to go along holistic lines in his analysis, at this point he is 
careful to emphasise that at the same time he believes that the principles of Buddhist 
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ethics are not sui generis; they are not to be understood exclusively on their own 
terms.  This  is  important  in  relation  to  Aristotle’s  belief  that  ethical  action  is  not 
dependent  on  merely  subjective  judgements.    Furthermore,  there  is  an  objective 
criterion of what is ethical which ranks above conventional and cultural norms.  
What  Keown  underlines  is  that  the  Buddha  and  Aristotle  are  in  agreement  about  the 
fundamental importance of aiming at a life of human perfection by developing a person’s 
knowledge  and  character,  that  is,  both  the  head  and  the  heart.
183    The  key  similarity 
between the Buddha and Aristotle, in respect of attaining the goal of perfection, is their 
view of moral virtue: both hold that our human happiness depends on our being able to 
control our desires and emotions. In Chapter Three I drew out the differences between 
them in their ends and the paths for achieving those ends. Aristotle sees the virtues as 
developing our nature, but not transforming it, with the emphasis throughout on rational 
choice.      For  the  Buddha,  desires  and  emotions  are  radically  reshaped  from  the 
perspective of the realization of selflessness, with the emphasis more on the meditative 
disciplines. However, a significant point of similarity between them is their insistence on 
the foundational importance of the education of feelings, beginning with the early training 
of desires and emotions, if one is to lead a good life. 
Keown  illustrates  the  similarity  between  the  two  ethics  by  describing  them  in  their 
respective terms. An Aristotelian moral life is one of development:  the attainment of 
eudaimonia  involves  true  happiness  and  a  human  flourishing  in  which  the  psyche  is 
marked by excellences of reason and character. The aetiology of a virtuous action for 
Aristotle is that it is an action done for its own sake and any virtuous action has the 
intrinsic quality of bringing about human flourishing.
184 Though human flourishing is of 
direct benefit to the individual agent, given Aristotle’s notion of man as a social/political 
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being, all individual flourishing also contributes to the building up or flourishing of the 
community – for Aristotle, the city-state or polis.  
From within his own framework, the Buddha’s moral life is one of the transformation of 
the individual: this is achieved by eliminating both spiritual ignorance and attachment, 
which feed off each other, by cultivating intellectual, emotional and moral virtues, and 
sharing something of the qualities of the goal towards which they move. To be virtuous, 
therefore, a moral action is one done primarily for its own sake and only secondarily for 
its results, for the Buddha as well as for Aristotle.  Though the former perceives it as a 
transformative  process  and  the  latter  conceives  of  it  as  a  developmental  one,  in  both 
Aristotelian and Buddhist ethics: 
An individual good action embodies a virtue which conduces to and ‘participates’ in 
the goal of human perfection; over a lifetime such good actions conjoin to attain 
human perfection.
185   
 
Both are ‘teleological’ in that they advocate an action which moves towards a telos or 
goal/end with which they have an intrinsic, intentional relationship,
186 as opposed to their 
being simply ‘consequentialist,’ that is, the extrinsic good of Utilitarianism: judging an 
act by the effects it happens to have.
187 
Now we must ask, in respect of any link we claim between psychology and moral 
philosophy, how far may Aristotelian and Buddhist ethics be said to resemble each 
other?  The existence of a relationship between morality and the emotions has been 
recognised for a long time by moral philosophers but the nature of the relationship has 
continued to be disputed. Both Hobbes
188 and Hume,
189 for example, tried to ground 
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morality entirely in the emotions, while others, such as Kant,
190 sought to account for 
morality in terms of reason alone.  Buddhism is commonly, and mistakenly, identified 
in the West with the Socratic position, which maintains that virtue is reducible to 
knowledge. Keown  contests this view on the basis that, just as neither vedana or 
feeling, nor sanna or thinking are reducible to one another, so neither of the two basic 
values of Buddhism, sila or morality and prajna or knowledge is reducible to the 
other. He offers an alternative approach, previously mentioned: viewing the reason-
emotion bifurcation as artificial and seeking a ‘middle way’ between them.  This is 
the Aristotelian tradition and, for Keown, the view most congenial to Buddhism. For 
both  of  these  approaches  reason  and  feeling  are  complementary  rather  than 
disjunctive.
191 In the context of modern moral philosophy, the argument regarding the 
interplay  of  reason  and  feeling  is  one  that  is  well  established  (cf.  the  stream  of 
literature following its reprise by MacIntyre).  However, as indicated earlier in this 
chapter,  Keown’s  thesis  is  innovative.  In  likening  the  Buddha’s  ‘middle  way’  to 
Aristotle’s ‘doctrine of the mean,’ it presents the opposite view to that of Gowans, 
who holds that the similarity between the two ways is merely formal.   
I will examine the connections Keown claims between their respective psychologies 
and philosophies. In speaking of the Buddhist context, he describes the emotions as: 
[T]hat non-rational dimension of psychic life which manifests itself across a 
spectrum  or  continuum  of  non-cognitive  responses  ranging  from  aversion, 
hostility,  anger  and  wrath  (encapsulated  by  dosa  or  hatred),  to  attachment, 
craving,  longing  and  lust  (encapsulated  by  lobha  or  greed).  These  are  the 
extremes;  the  middle  range  of  this  continuum  embraces  attitudes  such  as 
benevolence, kindness, affection and sympathy.
192   
 
What  is  the  evidence  in  the  Buddhist  context  for  a  link  between  emotion  and 
morality? Keown searches for it in the life and actions of the Buddha-to-be, Siddattha 
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Gautama,  in  an  effort  to  establish  whether  the  Buddha’s  ethical  perfection  was 
founded on  a sentiment of moral  concern where ‘moral concern’ means non-self-
referential concern for the welfare of others. By ‘sentiment’ is meant a non-cognitive 
state as distinct from the intellectual understanding or acceptance of the validity or 
rationality of a set of moral rules or principles. A ‘moral intuitionist’ approach is apt 
to be at the expense of reason, cf., Hume’s aphorism: “Reason is the slave of the 
passions.” As I hope to make clear, an outright appeal to the emotions is not the sole 
ground  of  Buddhist  morality.    But  whilst  the  field  of  Buddhist  ethics  would  be 
narrowed by collapsing them into a single form, in Mahayana Buddhism which is the 
focus here, the final emphasis is on compassion. Moral appreciation means caring 
about others and the effects that one’s acts or non-acts will have upon them. Keown 
likens this regard for other persons to what, in the eighteenth century, Hume called 
the ‘natural affections;’ he characterises it in Buddhist terms as metta or love in the 
sense of ‘loving-kindness.’  While there is a link, it is not as strong as Keown claims. 
Hume himself says that in general: 
There is no such passion in the human mind as the love of mankind, merely as 
such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to ourself.
193 
 
Hume considered general benevolence (Buddhist compassion) possible as a ‘natural 
virtue’ for a few people only, since he thought it too remote and sublime a motive for 
most  people.    For  the  latter  it  is  an  ‘artificial  virtue;’  they  strive  for  general 
benevolence because, as a result of education and social expectations, they think it the 
right attitude to have.  
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In Aristotelian ‘psychology’ we do not find such a direct expression of the motive of 
Humean  benevolence  nor  of  Buddhist  compassion  at  the  heart  of  moral  life.  The 
motivating claim on the man of practical wisdom for virtuous action with regard to 
others derives from his leading a life of virtue: we have seen that he must choose to 
live it for its own sake and not for egoistic reasons. Aristotle’s high-minded view – 
that the life of the person who ‘presents truth’ will lead to her flourishing as well as 
that of her community (given their interdependence) – has been previously indicated.    
However, in the absence of any other-regarding sentiment it is arguable that there can 
be no motive for true moral action since the needs of others will fail to make any 
claim  upon  us.    Aristotle’s  expression  of  other-regarding  sentiment  differs  in 
emphasis from that of  Hume and the  Buddha,  but goodwill and friendship are as 
essential to his account of moral motivation as sympathy and compassion are to theirs 
respectively. 
For  Aristotle,  “Goodwill  is  a  friendly  sort  of  relation,  but  is  not  identical  with  
friendship.”
194  What distinguishes it from friendship is that one wishes the other well 
but would not put oneself out for her; Aristotle likens it to “inactive friendship.”
195 
Goodwill  in  his  sense  seems  the  same  as  Hume’s  ‘benevolence;’  it  can  be  the 
beginning of growth into friendship where it is interrelated, for Aristotle, with two 
other central components, concord and beneficence.  
 Friendship is a signal feature of eudaimon individuals. However, for Aristotle, the 
motivation of friendship depends on a sense of reciprocal admiration for each other’s 
virtues, on the wish for a friend’s benefit for her own sake, rather than on a sense of 
mutual  concern.  In  Book  IX  Aristotle  argues  that  most  people  only  really  put 
themselves out for those they love, and can only love those they know.  He believes 
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that private life — the household and the small circle of one's friends — provides the 
best or most favorable scope for the exercise of virtue for most people. But Aristotle  
also believes that those who do put themselves out for the whole city do a “fine and 
godlike” thing;
196 such virtuous activity resembles Humean benevolence or Buddhist 
compassion more closely. Whilst he is convinced that the loss of virtuous activity in 
the private sphere would greatly detract from a well-lived life, Aristotle does not have 
a satisfactory explanation for why this would be. It might have been better if he had 
pinpointed the benefits of being the object of a close friend's care and concern.  In the 
absence of friendship we would lose a benefit that could not be replaced by the care 
of the larger community. But Aristotle conceives of friendship as lying primarily in 
activity rather than receptivity. This makes it difficult for him to show that virtuous 
activity towards a friend is the uniquely important good he claims in Chapter IX: 
“Without friends, no one would choose to live, though he had all the other goods.”
197  
 
Is there any evidence of other-regarding sentiment as the ground of Buddhist ethics?  
Aronson’s ‘Love and Sympathy in Theravada Buddhism’ (1980) provides evidence 
from the numerous references to Gautama’s sympathy in the Theravada discourses 
that such a sentiment underpins the conduct of the Buddha and his disciples. The 
Buddha’s  moral  concern  is  found  in  his  sympathy  or  anukampa  for  all  beings.
198  
Aronson emphasises that the Buddha’s moral concern was not a consequence of his 
enlightenment, it preceded it:  
Gotama’s fundamental motive in arising and coming to be was his concern for 
others’ welfare.
199  
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In further support of his view, Aronson quotes the Buddha’s own words:  
Monks, there is one individual who arose and came to be for the welfare of the 
multitudes, for the happiness of the multitudes, out of sympathy for the world; for 
the  benefit,  welfare,  and  happiness  of  gods  and  humans.    Who  is  that  one 
individual?  The Harmonious One, the Perfectly Enlightened One.
 200 
 
The Buddha is described in discourses as: 
[S]ympathetic to all creatures. If with joyous heart he teaches others it is not 
from duty, but out of compassion and sympathy.
201 
 
This is the polar opposite of Kant’s ethical motive and, pace Aristotle, not the kind of 
expression we associate with the phronimos.   
 
In  the  face  of  the  compassion  attributed  to  the  Buddha,  it  is  clearly  a 
misunderstanding  of  the  doctrine  of  karma  to  view  Buddhist  ethics  as  motivated 
basically by the self-interested pursuit of karmic merit. The fact that sub-moral self-
interest is displayed by some Buddhists is no more an argument for the claim that 
Buddhist ethics is ‘egoistical’ than is the fact that, because some Christians keep the 
commandments  in  the  hope  of  going  to  heaven,  Christian  morality  is  merely 
enlightened self-interest.  Keown points out that to require a non-moral reason for 
ethical action in Buddhism, for example, the incentive of karmic benefits, already 
shows a lack of moral concern.
 202  Sympathy is not a reason in this sense: it is a non-
rational sentiment which precedes the formulation of moral objectives.  Sympathy is 
not a matter of the power of the will: a sentiment of concern cannot be engendered by 
a cognitive act.
203  One cannot simply make oneself care.  The Buddha’s emphasis on 
the need to re-align the emotions is similar to Aristotle’s stress on the early training 
                                                 
200 Ibid. 
201 Sn. 693 
202 Keown, op. cit. 74 
203 Keown, op. cit. 74   94 
and  habituation  of  young  children  in  appropriate  feeling  as  the  foundation  of  the 
moral  virtues  but  to  a  limited  degree.  The  radicalism  of  the  Buddhist  path 
distinguishes it from that of Aristotle. And it is from the Buddha’s own exemplary 
moral life that his followers draw inspiration and a model for their conduct, with 
morality understood not as a means to an end but an end in itself; it cannot be adopted 
as  a  means  to  an  end  because  sympathy  cannot  be  adopted  by  a  simple,  rational 
decision.  Either  of  their  psychologies  might  be  taken  to  an  extreme,  of  course,  
transgression of the precepts might be justified on grounds of Buddhist compassion, 
hardness of heart on the part of the phronimos, but in both cases they cease to be 
virtues.    
The  emphasis  in  the  Buddha’s  ethical  motivation  has  been  highlighted  as  very 
different from Aristotle’s psychology.  However, they do share common ground and 
in more than teleology. In defence of Keown’s claim of the similarity between the two 
ethics, it is important to reiterate that emotion and reason play a conjoint part in the 
moral life for the Buddha and Aristotle. Moral decision derives from an integration of 
emotion  and  reason  for  each  of  them.    For  the  Buddha,  what  is  needed  is  a  re-
alignment  of  the  emotions  with  right  views  through  meditation,  whilst  Aristotle’s 
phronimos is able to make rational, moral judgements spontaneously on the basis of 
trained dispositions of character and educated feelings. The two approaches differ in 
emphasis,  but  the  common  strand  is  that  a  gradual  cultivation  of  moral  and 
intellectual virtues must take place, in either case, if the ‘middle way’ is to succeed.   
After examining the similarities between Buddhist and Aristotelian ethics, I am no 
less convinced of the differences between them. Indeed, on completing this chapter, it 
is even clearer, that the particular hallmark of Buddhist ethics is compassion, whereas 
that of Aristotle is reason. However, on account of similarities at the heart of their   95 
ethics, the conclusion to this chapter is that the interplay between the two ethics is far 
more nuanced than anything the previous chapter suggested.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   96 
Chapter Five  
Implications for a “moral way” in an increasingly secular society 
My aim in this chapter is to postulate “a moral way.”  It will be drawn from the interplay  
between aspects of Aristotelian and Buddhist ethics that I carried out in previous chapters.  
This endeavour presents one response to MacIntyre’s question as to what type of people 
we ought to become. 
This chapter does not aim to present a new theory of moral education or provide an entire 
ethical programme for implementing at home and/or school; either undertaking would 
exceed the remit of this work.  The author’s intention is to point to an objective moral 
framework  with  universal  appeal.    My  suggestions  are  primarily  directed  towards  a 
pluralist Scottish audience of parents and schoolteachers in the main, with a focus on 
young children. However, in the course of this research I have become more aware of the 
needs of undergraduate students, in particular, and have subsequently extended the remit 
in  my  introduction  to  include  Scottish  students  in  tertiary  education.  To  this  end, 
following both Aristotle and the Buddha, who each insisted in his own way that ethics 
was not to be considered an exact science, I will provide rudimentary guidelines for a 
moral  way,  particularly  for  those  involved  in  the  formal  education  of  children.    In 
addition, I will propose introducing students in tertiary education to mindfulness practice. 
 
In  broad  terms,  the  comparison  between  Aristotelian  and  Buddhist  ethics  yielded  a 
twofold result: they are similar in that, in both cases, the heart of the moral life is to be 
understood  in  terms  of  the  interplay  of  both  reason  and  feeling;  they  differ  in  the 
emphasis and perspective each has on reason and compassion respectively. The Buddha 
calls for universal compassion above all and attends less to reason. Aristotle founds his 
ethics on reason principally and compassion as a motivation is confined mainly to friends.    97 
I have argued that the differences are due to their distinct metaphysics. For any suggested 
moral way I will draw on what I consider their complementary strengths.  
Jan Steutel and Ben Spieker claim: 
[T]he beliefs that sentimental education is a vital part of moral education and that 
habituation is a major part of sentimental education are at the ‘hard core’ of the 
Aristotelian tradition of moral thought and action.
204 
  
By ‘sentimental education’ they understand: 
[T]he practice of cultivating the child’s feelings, that is, his passions, inclinations, 
emotions, appetites, pains and pleasures.
205  
 
The adjective ‘sentimental’ has several layers of meaning in English. It may refer to a 
sense of affective connection in relation to places, people, and so on. But it can also refer 
to an artificially contrived, affective ‘take’ in music, art, films, and relations with others. 
To take one example, the paintings of Joan Eardley which captured life in the crumbling 
post-war tenements of Glasgow’s Townhead illustrated the kind of subject matter that 
could be, and was, dismissed as sentimental – look at how the poor live: miserable though 
they are, they are still happy or something approaching it, despite their lack of goods.
206 
The latter sense of ‘sentimental,’ often used disparagingly, contrasts sharply with the rich 
Enlightenment  sense  of  the  term  ‘sentiment.’  For  Hume  the  sentiments  refer  to  the 
‘natural affections,’ that is, only to an affective sense of positive connectedness in relation 
to places, people, and so on.  For Adam Smith the ‘sentimental science’ was the science 
of psychology.  Steutel and Spieker understand and use the term ‘sentimental education’ 
in  their  article  with  reference  to  the  Enlightenment  tradition,  but,  in  order  to  avoid 
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confusion with the pejorative sense in which the term may be used to-day, I prefer the 
phrase ‘education of feelings.’  
 
Steutel and Spieker endorse two Aristotelian claims for according education of feelings a 
central role in moral education: the first is that becoming a virtuous person should be 
taken as the general aim of moral education; the second is that moral virtues are not only 
dispositions for choice and action but also dispositions towards feelings – virtuousness 
implies  having  appropriate  feelings.  Aristotle  himself  emphasises  that  the  earlier  one 
begins, the better; “the importance of having been trained from infancy to feel joy or grief 
at the right things.”
207 This pre-supposes that the affective life of the child not only can be 
influenced but can be educated.  Although Aristotle locates feelings in the non-rational 
part of the soul, they can obey and listen to the rational part: 
[N]ot just in the sense that feelings can be kept under control if they are contrary to 
the  precepts  of  reason  (which  is  typical  of  continence),  but  also,  and  more 
importantly, in the sense that they can be harmonised with the voice of reason by 
their being transformed, moulded or reshaped (which is typical of virtuousness).
208 
 
Steutel and Spiecker list various types of educational interventions in the Aristotelian 
tradition through which the affective life of the child can be transformed and steered in 
the  right  direction:  reading  stories,  taking  the  child  to  the  theatre  and  cinema,  and 
providing  opportunities  for  mimetic  enactment  of  poetry,  song  and  dance,  so  as  to 
encourage the child to emulate virtuous models and learn to discriminate.
209  However, 
the central method of cultivating feelings for Aristotle is ethismos or habituation.  The 
idea that habituation is an important ingredient of education of feelings is another part of 
the ‘hard core’ of the Aristotelian tradition.
210  Habituation was referred to previously as 
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primarily a form of learning by doing. Steutel and Spieker are only two authors among 
many who quote Aristotle’s well-known lines in respect of this:
 211 
By doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or 
unjust,  and  by  doing  the  acts  that  we  do  in  the  presence  of  danger,  and  by 
habituating ourselves to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly…. It 
makes no small difference then, whether we form habits of one kind or another from 
our very youth; it makes a great difference or rather all the difference… 
212 
 
No  child  will  acquire  virtuous  affective  dispositions,  if  we  confine  our  educational 
activities to verbal instruction or teaching moral lessons.  We need only bring to mind the 
sentimental moralising deemed suitable for children in British Victorian life and fiction.  
Aristotle left very few indications about how to put habituation into practice but his use of 
the term pollakis, which literally means ‘many  times,’ implies that, to be efficacious, 
habituation implies doing virtuous actions frequently.
213 Whilst habit becomes habit only 
through strength of repetition, our understanding of reinforcement learning in this context 
is differentiated from that of conditioning by the positive context of reception advocated 
by Aristotle in respect of habituation. Furthermore, he points out in several places that 
virtuous  actions  should  also  be  performed  consistently,  that  is,  one  acts  always  in  a 
virtuous way, and, as far as possible, never in a way contrary to virtue.
214  It is worth 
noting that frequency and consistency will not coincide with regard to certain actions, for 
example,  those  that  occur  only  at  widely  spaced  intervals.    Here  what  counts  in  the 
Aristotelian tradition is consistency, in celebrating Christmas with a generous spirit every 
year, let’s say.  
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Finally, though the child is not yet able to decide which action should be performed in 
the particular circumstances, she is able to perform those actions that correspond with 
virtuous dispositions of feeling, given the guidance of her parents in particular or 
other tutors, provided that they themselves possess practical wisdom.
215  The authors 
describe parents, guardians, teachers, and so on, as a child’s ‘tutors.’  The term ‘tutor’ 
refers to any caregiver who points a child in the right direction in action and feeling in 
the process of habituation.  To my mind, ‘tutor’ is a felicitous choice for anyone 
responsible for habituating children, and it will be used here with its implicit sense of 
careful steering.  This is the third feature of habituation in the Aristotelian tradition.  
Some  forms  of  habituation  are  ways  of  modifying  what  may  be  termed  ‘excessive’ 
feelings. Cultivating the appropriate dispositions of feeling that constitute the virtue of 
patience, for example, is a matter of what Steutel and Spieker describe as: 
[M]oderating the child’s liability to respond with excessive feelings of impetuosity, 
irritation and boredom by accustoming him to situations in which patient behaviour 
is required. 
216 
 
One assumes that the ‘situations’ are stage-appropriate to the child’s developmental level, 
are rendered interesting, and that the young child’s ‘patient behaviour’ is appropriately 
rewarded. These might be thought extrinsic pedagogical factors, but they are still apt for 
philosophical consideration.  Admittedly, Aristotle’s examples of habituation refer only to 
virtues of will-power, especially temperance and courage, where habituation is a matter of 
attenuating or getting rid of inappropriate affective dispositions.
217  To be successful, the 
latter, like all forms of habituation, needs to be effected in a developmentally appropriate 
manner.  A young child who has temper tantrums is led to understand gradually, from 
earliest days, that this form of behaviour is socially unacceptable, by a quiet but firm 
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removal from the scene. The crucial importance of early habituation is revealed when 
tutors have to deal with a young teenager having temper tantrums in public.  A more 
urgent message has to be conveyed on the spot both for the sake of others as well as that 
of the young person; when calm is restored it may then be possible to use the latter’s 
verbal and social skills in order to see how the problem may be addressed. 
Another important form of habituation is that of strengthening or promoting the growth of 
virtuous affective dispositions, a process which is arguably at the heart of the education of 
moral feelings. Aristotle addresses this form only implicitly in his assumption that the 
young child’s tutors, parents in particular, themselves possess practical wisdom; they not 
only can guide her but can also model appropriate virtues.  
According  to  Philippa  Foot,  the  virtues  are  corrective,  in  that  they  either  moderate 
excessive  temptation  (as  mentioned  previously)  or  compensate  for  deficiency  in 
motivation. So, the corrective function of moral virtues such as justice and benevolence is 
quite different from the virtues of will-power. The former correspond rather to making 
good or remedying deficiencies of motivation such as a lack of respect for the rights of 
one’s  fellow-citizens  or  a  limited  concern  for  other  people’s  needs,  respectively.
218  
Aristotle does not specify how the virtuous dispositions of feeling required to be just and 
kind  towards  others  are  to  be  brought  about  through  habituation.  We  must  now  ask 
ourselves if his work gives us a clue, as to how habituation establishes and strengthens the 
concerns and commitments that make up, for example, justice and benevolence.  
The third feature of habituation mentioned previously – the reliance of the child on the 
practical wisdom of her tutors – points to an explanation of how habituation might work 
towards the growth and development of virtuous affective dispositions.  Of course, the 
child should follow the instructions of someone who is practically wise.  But the practical 
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wisdom required for giving the child the proper instructions is only one of the reasons for 
Aristotle’s thesis that the tutor must be virtuous: 
Being a virtuous person not only implies having the intellectual virtue of practical 
wisdom: it also implies having essentially moral virtues, and these virtues might 
best be construed in terms of particular cares or concerns ……  Such virtuous cares 
and  concerns  are  not  merely  dispositions  to  act  in  certain  ways…….  but  also 
dispositions to have and exhibit particular feelings or to feel and exhibit particular 
emotions,  such  as  compassion,  sympathy,  respect,  indignation,  distress,  relief, 
admiration and gratitude.
219 
 
Given the fact that the tutor is a person with virtuous cares and concerns, habituation may 
now be seen as a more nuanced and relational process. When the child is acting rightly, 
the tutor will respond in word or deed with positive feelings and emotions, exhibiting 
pleasure,  relief  or  pride.    And  when  the  child  is  acting  wrongly,  the  tutor  will  show 
negative feelings and emotions, such as sorrow, anger, or disappointment.   Especially in 
respect  of  the  latter,  it  is  assumed  that  the  tutor’s  responses  are  appropriate  to  the 
situation, for example, expressed to the right degree, in the right manner, not some public 
humiliation.  Moreover, all the tutor’s manifestations of virtuous cares and concerns serve 
as reinforcing or punishing stimuli: 
In particular, if there is a mutual loving relationship between the child and his tutor, 
which will normally be the case if the tutor is his parent, the child will experience 
the  tutor’s  positive  affective  responses  as  pleasurable  and  the  negative  affective 
responses as painful. 
In more general terms, the tutor will function as a model…… The tutor’s virtuous 
cares  and concerns will be exhibited in virtuous deeds and appropriate affective 
responses, and given a good relationship of love and trust between the tutor and the 
child, the child will be inclined to imitate those actions and responses.
220 
 
So, the presence of a virtuous tutor is a key-factor in establishing and strengthening the 
scope of the child’s cares and concerns where these are deficient. 
A school can be a living embodiment of such a philosophy by encouraging pupils to 
perform virtuous acts “deliberately” on a daily basis. At the root of its success will not be 
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that  it  is  brainwashing  its  pupils  into  performing  acts  of  friendliness,  kindness  and 
fairness, but that the pupils are constantly being made aware that they can decide whether 
or not they want to do these things. These acts are superogatory to acts of discipline such 
as observing good order in class. At every level, the pupils are made aware that they 
shape the school’s ethos with their own collective decisions: even a simple ritual like 
standing up when the teacher comes into the room – something that has disappeared from 
many schools – can be presented as a habit that inculcates a virtuous comportment.
221  
Within a faith school, for example, pupils might fare better (particularly at secondary 
level), if they were made aware that they were not compelled to take part in religious 
rituals but were reminded that their worship of God is their own choice.  Pupils might be 
made aware of the choice they have in shaping their own articulations of spiritual worship 
by being invited to devise their own daily acts of worship, create their own assemblies, 
choose  their  own  hymns,  poems,  readings,  and  so  on.  In  this  way,  their  “spiritual 
exercises” become “deliberate performances of virtuous acts” in the Aristotelian sense. 
Moreover, a good school recognises something that Aristotle saw as crucial in shaping a 
decent  moral  society  –  an  understanding  and  appreciation  of  the  external,  cultural 
environment and the tradition it provides: 
[I]t is difficult to get from youth up a right training for virtue, if one has not been 
brought up under right laws….different soils better or worse nourish the seed.
222 
 
Ultimately the policies of such a school will be shaped by an overarching philosophy, 
whether drawn from its own faith or other tradition, such as Rudolf Steiner, for example. 
This means it can withstand undesirable pressures arising from short-term government 
policies or driven by fashionable cultural attitudes. A school that is a living embodiment 
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of Aristotle’s idea of human flourishing will be marked by the happiness of its pupils, 
manifested at key moments in their celebration of the wonder of their being alive. 
The educational curriculum is a specific area that comes to mind in any consideration of 
how the virtues may best be developed in schools. In his article, ‘On the contribution of 
literature and the arts to the educational cultivation of moral virtue, feeling and emotion,’ 
David Carr examines the connections between a number of claims concerning education 
in general and moral education in particular.  He makes a convincing case on four fronts: 
education is about broad cultural initiation rather than narrow academic or vocational 
training; he recommends an education that has a prime concern with the moral dimension 
of  personal  development;  emotional  growth  has  an  important  role  in  such  moral 
formation; literature and other arts have an important part to play in any education of 
feelings. In respect of the last claim, Carr argues that: 
[W]hat is needed for a clear view of the moral educational relevance of literature 
and the arts is a conception of moral education that does justice to the interplay 
between  the  cognitive  and  the  affective  in  moral  life,  and  that  a  non-relativist 
Aristotelian ethics of virtue holds out the best prospect for such a moral education of 
reason and feeling.
223 
 
Carr is careful to differentiate a moral education based on Aristotelian ethics of virtue 
from ‘Character Education.’  The latter form of personal formation has been introduced 
into schools, particularly in North America, in the last twenty years.  Its proponents claim 
that this type of moral education also originates from Aristotelian virtue ethics. Similarly 
to  what  Carr  advocates,  they  too  make  use  of  literature  and  the  arts  in  primary  and 
secondary education.  However, their emphasis is not so much on the education of feeling 
and deciding whether one wants to do these things for oneself, as on the more practical or 
experiential  initiation  into  such  moral  dispositions  as  self-control,  responsibility, 
                                                 
223 Carr, D. [2005] ‘On the contribution of literature and the arts to the educational cultivation of moral 
virtue, feeling and emotion,’ Journal of Moral Education, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 137     105 
truthfulness which assist the discipline and general ethos of the school. Thus, character 
educators are more inclined to draw out exemplary role models to be found in literature 
for  emulation  by  students,  for  example,  the  eponymous  hero  of  Mark  Twain’s  satire 
Huckleberry Finn, who lies to the bounty hunters out of a sense of justice on behalf of his 
companion Jim, the runaway slave. The advocates of ‘Character Education’ concentrate 
more on using literature and the arts for inculcating virtuous behaviour. They show a less 
sophisticated understanding of the relation of literature and the arts to Aristotelian ethics 
of virtue than that of Carr, who views the relation of the two as a powerful means of 
cultivating moral virtue, feeling, and emotion, as well as aesthetic values.   
Thus far we have two strategies for tutors to help students make good choices: raising 
awareness by general discussion about virtues within the school; inspiring understanding 
of the virtues by how literature and the arts are taught. Moreover, whilst discussion of 
morally pivotal moments can be integrated into everything in the curriculum – history and 
science spring to mind – literature and the arts are also particularly appropriate for the 
cultivation of moral feeling on account of their appeal to sensibilities, as Carr suggests. 
The latter does not happen by ignoring the complexity or beauty of the story or picture 
and jumping to its “moral” but by connecting the aesthetic effect of the story or picture to 
discussion about the feelings it evokes. General questions could include: What did this 
poem make you think about or feel?  Tell me about X – what kind of person was she?  
What words does the poet use to convey the wastefulness of war? 
A further strategy, clearly depending on habituation of children from a young age, if their 
choices are to become spontaneous later, is that of encouraging practical action for those 
less fortunate than themselves. Finding what can be done for the latter, whilst learning to 
appreciate what we have in common as fellow human beings, is a hallmark of pupil-
exchange programmes under the auspices of ‘Glasgow the Caring City/Global Glasgow   106 
Youth Project.’  Pupils involved in the latter project also helped to raise funds for the 
most recent exchange which took place in June, 2007, between senior pupils from certain 
Glasgow schools and their counterparts in a South African township.   
Another appropriate strategy at all levels in school and in all areas of enquiry is that of 
fostering reflection by the tutor’s questions. For example, students may be asked to think 
about and give their own responses to a question such as:  Can a person be “great” (and 
good) and still have some character flaws?  
In  addition  to  the  contributions  made  by  one’s  milieu  and  one’s  natural  endowment, 
Aristotle’s optimism regarding the human capacity for choice emerges in his belief that 
one’s attitude, given one’s position, influences the formation of one’s dispositions and 
character: 
Even if I am brought up a wastrel who will, unless changed, end up in wretchedness 
and misery, it is possible for me, whatever training I have had, to recognize the facts 
and then retrain myself to better ways.
224 
 
In  a  similar  vein  in  Buddhism  the  ‘depth  purity’  in  each  individual,  known  in  the 
Mahayana  as  the  Tathagata-garba  or  the  Buddha-nature,  represents  the  potential  for 
transformation.  It is a stronger version of Aristotle’s notion that acquiring the virtues is a 
transforming process which enables man to make the leap from  ‘man-as-he-is’ to ‘man-
as-he-might-be.’  While Aristotle speaks of a settled state (of character) and Buddhism 
speaks, quite differently, of a changing one (of impermanence), the implication is similar: 
whatever people are like on the surface, they should always be respected as capable of 
change for the better. 
The comparison of each of their ethics suggests that the practice of mindfulness may 
be considered as the Buddhist contribution to the task of that transformation, alluded 
to previously, in conjunction with the Aristotelian practice of habituation into the 
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virtues; each compensates for weakness in the other, or, to put it another way, their 
strengths are complementary. For this reason, my initial suggestion is to introduce 
mindfulness practice at all levels of education: primary, secondary, and tertiary. At 
this stage such an innovation needs further research and a pilot study, to investigate 
empirically the results of such practice, before it might be implemented in Scottish 
education. As a preliminary to such an undertaking, I will show that the results of 
mindfulness practice elsewhere, as reflected in research and teacher report, are helpful 
in respect of strengthening concentration, increasing memory potential, and reducing 
feelings of stress.  
The main aim of the Garrison Institute’s report ‘Contemplation in Education’ was to 
“map  out  the  current  status  of  programmes  using  contemplative  techniques  with 
mainstream student populations from Kindergarten to grade 12 (4-18 years).”
225  The 
terms ‘contemplation’ and ‘contemplative’ as used in the report refer to what are more 
generally  understood  by  ‘meditation’  and  ‘meditative,’  both  in  Britain  and  in  the 
United States; I shall adhere to the latter usage.  
 The report describes many of the programmes which aim at teaching mindfulness and 
training attention as “Loose adaptations of the Mindfulness-based Stress Reduction 
programme.”
226  The MBSR eight-week programme was designed by Jon Kabat-Zinn 
who is still engaged in bringing mindfulness into the mainstream of medicine and 
society  in  his  work  as  scientist,  writer  and  meditation  teacher.
227  The  ‘Center  for 
Mindfulness in Medicine, Health Care, and Society’ in Massachusetts was established 
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to  further  the  practice  and  integration  of  mindfulness  in  the  lives  of  individuals, 
institutions, and society through a wide range of clinical, research, education, and 
outreach initiatives in the public and private sector.
228  
The MBSR programme uses various mindfulness meditation practices, such as silent 
meditations, awareness of the breath and body scans (for heartbeat, perspiration levels 
and so on) as well as movement practices such as gentle stretching and mindful yoga. 
Extensive  research  on  the  MBSR  model  shows  that  adult  participants  experience 
multiple positive outcomes including reduced stress, increased relaxation, less pain, 
increased tolerance of pain, and improved self-esteem.
229 The Centre for Mindfulness 
believes  that  students,  teachers  and  other  members  of  the  school  community  can 
benefit from mindfulness and other meditative techniques in an effort “to become 
more responsive and less reactive, more focused and less distracted, more calm and 
less stressed.” 
230 
In the context of the Garrison Institute’s Mapping Project, meditative programmes are 
those  with  pedagogical  approaches  which  cultivate  the  conditions  that  create  the 
possibility of meditative awareness:  
They  emphasise  mindfulness  and  focus  on  improving  students’  capacity  for 
attention. In contrast, programmes that use meditative techniques –but are not 
meditative programmes –foster meditation in support of other, typically broader 
goals, such as the development of social and emotional skills.
231   
 
                                                 
 
229 Garrison Institute Report’s online text ‘Contemplation in Education,’ Fn.  6, p.7: Diamond, A., 
Taylor, C., “Development of an Aspect of Executive Control”, Developmental Psychology 1996:29, pp. 
315-334  
 229 Op. cit. Fn. 7, p. 7 Diamond A., Goldman-Rakic P.S., “Comparison of human infants and rhesus 
monkeys on Piaget’s AB task.,” Experimental Brain Research 1989: 74 (1), pp. 24-40 
230 Op. cit., 3-4 
 
 
 
   109 
The  Garrison  Report  cites  the  success  of  the  “Mindfulness  Education  (ME)  for 
Children”  programme.  ME  is  a  ten-week  intervention  in  the  Vancouver  School 
District,  BC,  Canada,  a  joint  programme  set  up  and  run  by  the  ‘Goldie  Hawn 
Foundation’ (subsequently re-named the ‘Goldie Hawn Institute’) and the University 
of British Columbia’s Education Faculty. It involves scientific research on student 
outcomes  associated  with  classroom-based  mindfulness  practices.
232  This  primary 
prevention programme consists of teaching a series of simple techniques designed to 
enhance self awareness, focused attention, problem solving abilities, self regulation, 
goal setting, stress reduction, conflict resolution and pro-social behaviours in children. 
Participants  numbered  hundreds  and  included  students  and  teachers  from  seven 
classes (Grades 4-7, 10-13 years), who received the ME programme and matched 
comparison classes. Prior to programme implementation, teachers attended a one day 
training session led by the programme developer. At pre-test and post-test, students 
were  given  measures  assessing  social-emotional  competence,  social  responsibility, 
and  motivation.  Teachers  also  provided  ratings  of  students’  school  adjustment. 
Measures  assessing  programme  implementation  were  also  gathered  including 
teachers’ and children’s evaluations of the programme and their experiences within it.  
 
Juniper Glass has reported favourably on the ‘Mindful Awareness Research Center’ 
(MARC) web-site on findings from the Vancouver schools’ ME programme. Though 
it  is  still  comparatively  early  in  the  life  of  the  project,  the  research  team  of  the 
University  of  British  Columbia’s  Educational  Faculty  have  recently  completed  a 
controlled  study  of  the  work  of  the  Goldie  Hawn  Institute  in  Vancouver.  Their 
research  involved  children  in  six  schools  and  showed  some  promising  results, 
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particularly  in  the  areas  of  children’s  self-concept,  ability  to  stay  attentive,  and 
teacher-reported  behaviours.  Heather  Wood  Ion,  Executive  Director  of  the  Goldie 
Hawn  Institute,  summed  up:  “We  had  learned  from  the  pilot  project  that  a  more 
research-based curriculum was needed in order to disseminate it more broadly.” Glass 
indicates that experts at Columbia University (United States) are now assisting the 
Goldie Hawn Institute to integrate its programme more closely within the curriculum, 
whilst researchers from UBC will now complete a second study in Vancouver public 
schools  examining  the  effects  of  mindfulness  education  on  children’s  levels  of 
cortisol, the stress hormone.
233  
 
Glass further reports for MARC on the organization, InnerKids, a California-based 
foundation that offers mindfulness awareness classes to schoolchildren rooted in what 
they call “the new ABCs”: attention, balance, clarity and compassion. The Director, 
S. Kaiser-Greenland, a meditation practitioner, consulted with education and mental 
health professionals to make the teachings appropriate for children: 
The  games  and  activities  we  play  with  the  kids  are  informed  by  spiritual 
practices that are effective in training attention. We’ve adapted them so that they 
are developmentally appropriate and fun. That’s why we are able to teach in the 
schools – the words we use and themes we teach are secular.  
 
One of the first things InnerKids teachers do with a new class is “slow and silent 
walking” – based on walking meditation: 
At the beginning we do races. The race is to see who can get to the line the 
slowest! You have to be very aware of your body in space in order to move that 
slowly. Gradually the students become aware of breathing while they walk, and 
feeling the soles of their feet against the floor. With older students we can use 
                                                 
233 MARC (UCLA ) online text “The new ABCs ”: attention, balance, clarity and compassion, Fourth 
section.  
235  Ibid.   
 
   
   111 
more traditional language for the practice, concentrating on the three phases of 
lifting, moving and placing the foot.
 234 
 
There are lecturers’ reports but as yet little substantial research using mindfulness 
practice /techniques in tertiary education.  The findings of P.D. Hall’s research into 
the effect of meditation on the academic performance of African-American college 
students  is  positive;  they  show  participants  in  the  meditation  group  as  having 
significantly  higher  semester  grade  point  averages  compared  to  those  in  the  non-
meditation  group.
235  My  acquaintance  with  fellow-students  while  studying  at 
university  led  me  to  ask  whether  such  an  approach  might  benefit  tertiary-level 
students in the Scottish education system.  
In 2001 Brother Rewatha, a Sri Lankan Buddhist monk in the Theravada tradition, 
established a Buddhist Vihara or centre in Maryhill, Glasgow.  In the academic year 
2006-07  he  offered  short  sessions  of  ‘Mindfulness  Practice’  in  the  University  of 
Glasgow  which  any  member  of  the  university  was  free  to  attend.    A  ‘drop-in’ 
approach was adopted which was supported by the chaplaincy and advertised on the 
‘Events’ page of the university’s website. Brother Rewatha has informed the author 
that he will continue this innovative venture in the academic session 2007-08. Of 
course, it is not possible to draw conclusions from the experience of a small core of 
self-selecting participants over such a short period but it is an interesting sign that it is 
to continue.  From informal exchanges with acquaintances and students of Glasgow 
University over the past three years (those interested in interfaith matters in Scotland 
but mainly with undergraduates whom  I met in the ‘World Religions’ module on 
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Buddhism) I have found many of them not merely interested in understanding the 
theory  behind  mindfulness/meditation  (for  examination  purposes)  but  in  getting  a 
sense of it experientially.  Admittedly, the author’s source of information that some 
students  are  interested  in  trying  an  introductory  level  of  mindfulness,  without 
considering it as part of a total practice, is drawn from among a self-selecting group. 
Not unusually, their interest arises from a variety of reasons: some young people are 
questioning the religious tradition they were brought up in and now wish to explore 
their own wisdom tradition as well as that of others; others admit to feelings of stress 
in  their  lives  and  hope  to  experience  through  the  practice  of  mindfulness  as  a 
meditative  technique  a  means  of  reducing  stress,  especially  before  exams;  a  few 
(mature) students express an interest in finding out about mindfulness as part of their 
spiritual or personal “journey.”   
Considering these various strands, the author suggests additionally that mindfulness 
practice is introduced (on a self-selecting basis) at the tertiary level of education, 
especially for those entering the education profession.  The hope is that prospective 
teachers in particular would find such experience useful, if they wished to introduce 
‘Mindfulness  Education’  (on  the  model  of  the  Vancouver  school  board  described 
previously) to improve learning in the classroom.  Of course, further rigorous research 
is  needed  concerning  the  links  between  transformative  learning,  concentration, 
calming and ‘Mindfulness Education/Practice,’ similar to that which has already taken 
place in the medical field regarding the benefits of mindfulness in cases of physical, 
stress-related illnesses, such as hypertension, as well as with mental health problems. 
Vokey  has  argued  consistently  in  his  work  for  appreciation  of  the  value  of 
mindfulness in everyday life and its meditative practice at all levels of education. In 
“Hearing,  Contemplating,  and  Meditating:  In  Search  of  the  Transformative   113 
Integration of Heart and Mind” he illustrates his thesis through his use of mindfulness 
with students in the Faculty of Education at the University of British Columbia: 
Doing so in a recent graduate course had encouraging results: beginning each 
class  with  shamatha  [meditative]  practice  provided  a  point  of  departure  for 
analyzing  readings  on  spirituality  and  education  as  well  as  an  open,  non-
judgmental environment for such creative activities as collective art making and 
collaborative poetry composition.
236   
 
 
Thus  he claims that  initial  experience  of  the  practice  of  mindfulness  will  assist 
students’ subsequent intellectual engagement and understanding, and we can claim, at 
least  tentatively,  that use  of  a  meditative  technique  facilitates  the  type 
of transformative learning which Vokey describes by a direct quote from Expanding 
the boundaries of transformative learning: 
[It] involves experiencing a deep, structural shift in the basic premises of 
thought, feelings, and actions. It is a shift in consciousness that dramatically 
and permanently alters our way of being in the world.
237  
 
Vokey’s own experience and analysis in his chapter are viewed through the prism of 
his own wisdom tradition and practice in Mahayana-Vajrayana Buddhism. After an 
exposition of his path in this tradition he sums it up as follows: if the components of 
the Mahayana path are to be fruitful they must be understood and practiced within 
their proper larger context.  From this he draws the following recommendation: 
Although my focus here has been on Buddhism, I appreciate that there are many 
other  living  traditions  with  time-tested  methods  of  integrating  intellectual 
understanding  with  direct  experience.  To  those  who  wish  to  explore  the 
potential contributions of meditation to transformative learning  I recommend 
that  they  remain  within  or  find  such  a  “wisdom  tradition”  with  which  they 
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Insights, Eppert, C. and Wang, H. (eds.), p. 308 
237 O’Sullivan, E. V., Morrell, A., & O’Connor, M.A. [2002]  p. xvii.  Quoted by Vokey, op. cit. 287 
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resonate  personally  so  that  the  experiential  dimension  of  their  journey  will 
receive proper direction and support.
238 
 
Vokey next recommends that any teacher, who does not wish to follow a wisdom 
tradition  but  wishes  to  offer  her  pupils  the  opportunity  to  improve  their  learning 
through  use  of  a  meditative  technique,  might  consider  opting  for  a  Mindfulness 
Education programme (including training for teachers) such as is now available, after 
the success of several pilot-studies, in the public schools in Vancouver.  However, he 
resumes his main thesis in his concluding suggestion that any educator who follows a 
wisdom  tradition  can  draw  on  it  when  using  mindfulness  practice  with  her  own 
students,  and  the  effect  will  be  to  transform  learning,  whatever  the  educator’s 
tradition.  
Any consideration of Vokey's recommendations with regard to their use within an 
increasingly pluralist society in Scotland requires more extensive study but two points 
spring to mind. Firstly, whilst it is understood that every wisdom tradition derives 
finally from religion, a teacher using a meditative technique to aid learning must take 
care not to tie it to a particular set of religious beliefs or doctrines for her pupils. For 
example, in the case of 'Mindfulness Education' in Vancouver, no attempt is made to 
link the exercises which precede lessons with the Buddhist practice of mindfulness.  
Secondly, if an approach such as Vokey advocates were proposed at primary and 
secondary  levels  of  education,  then  parents,  school  council,  head-teacher,  and 
teachers would all need to communicate about its potential to improve learning. If 
such an approach were offered to prospective teachers in Universities, a similar need 
for information and a stress on the voluntary nature of take-up would arise.  
 
The previous suggestions in Chapter Five dealt with the introduction into Scottish 
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education from earliest days of the Aristotelian practice of habituation into virtuous 
dispositions.  These  are  now  coupled  to  a  second  set  of  suggestions,  encouraging 
teachers and students at all levels of education to ‘try and see’ a meditative technique 
such as mindfulness, in order to enhance classroom learning. It has been argued here 
that the two practices are complementary and that they point to a "moral way" for 
young people in our pluralist society.  Of course, further rigorous research and pilot-
studies are clearly required, if firmer recommendations are to be made.   
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Conclusions and rounding-up 
Regarding the practice which is most new to me, mindfulness of body and mind, its 
preliminary stages were discussed in Chapter Two and suggestions made in Chapter 
Five for ‘mindful’ breathing and walking at primary and secondary school levels. The 
author examined the connection between Aristotelian reason and virtue in Chapter 
One and the practice of habituation in Chapter Five; suggestions were made as to how 
the latter practice might be incorporated into the academic curriculum, as well as the 
general ethos of the school.  Like the child’s early moral habituation, it would seem 
that the earlier mindfulness practice is introduced the better, though it may, of course, 
be taken up, to great advantage, at any age. A teacher who wishes to make use of 
these complementary practices might model herself on the virtuous tutor who draws 
on a wisdom tradition.  
A  further  suggestion  was  made  in  Chapter  Five  that  arose  in  the  course  of  the 
research; it might also be beneficial to introduce some form of mindfulness practice 
on a self-selecting basis in Universities. This might apply particularly in Faculties of 
Education, if prospective teachers were interested in providing mindfulness education 
in the future.  Of course, all these suggestions require further academic and empirical 
research in respect of their effectiveness, if stronger recommendations are to be made.  
 
The need to prepare the next generation to play their part in society is acknowledged 
in all cultures; in the West we expect our children to be able to step back from our 
pervasive consumerist culture and make responsible choices, but we ill-equip them to 
do so. Based on this comparative study of Buddhist and Aristotelian ethics, the author 
considers that complementary guidelines for a “moral way” for children and young   117 
people in all Scottish schools are to be found in the interplay of mindfulness and 
habituation, in an ethics more transformative than prescriptive. 
 
 If pilot studies are successful, the main recommendation of this thesis is that these 
two practices are introduced from the age of six years, that is, in Primary Two in 
Scottish schools, and maintained, in developmentally appropriate ways, into the teen-
age years.  I have argued that, if all children are made aware from the outset by their 
tutors – their parents, care-givers, teachers, lecturers – that they can make their own 
choices,  and  learn  to  do  so  virtuously  and  mindfully,  the  use  of  these  two 
complementary  practices  would  provide  them  with  a  rudimentary  “moral  way.”  
Hopefully, such a basis would equip young people to engage more confidently, more 
compassionately, and more fruitfully with their and our world. 
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